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INTRODUCTION
Former presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg made headlines last year when he took four weeks of leave from his job as
U.S. Secretary of Transportation to care for his newborn twins.1
Buttigieg’s decision was lauded in many corners, but not on Fox
News.2 Tucker Carlson had this to say: “Pete Buttigieg has been
on leave from his job . . . after adopting a child. Paternity leave,
they call it, trying to figure out how to breastfeed. No word on
how that went.”3 Carlson was derided for his failure to recognize
men as caregivers deserving of parental leave.4 Yet one of the
logics of Carlson’s comment—the absurdity of male involvement
in breastfeeding—went unremarked.
The notion that male involvement in breastfeeding is “offthe-wall”5 is not limited to the right-wing media. We can see it
1. See Katie Rogers, Pete Buttigieg Joins the Parental Leave Debate: “This
Is Work.,” N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/15/us/
politics/pete-buttigieg-parental-leave.html [https://perma.cc/G2NC-SBLC].
2. Ian Duncan, Mariana Alfaro & Eugene Scott, Republicans Fault Buttigieg for Time Off with Newborns. Democrats Say He’s Showing the Need for Paid
Parental Leave., WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
transportation/2021/10/15/pete-buttigieg-time-off-parental-leave [https://perma
.cc/9637-KSBN].
3. Tucker Carlson Tonight (Fox News television broadcast Oct. 14, 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FrMOlOA7F3E.
4. See Rogers, supra note 1 (describing criticism of the comments as “sexist” and “homophobic” and quoting Senator Tammy Duckworth’s response: “It’s
just as important for fathers to be there as mothers to be there.”).
5. See Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change)
the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 52
(2005) (noting how certain legal claims are considered so outside of the jurisprudential mainstream as to be considered “off-the-wall”).
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echoed across our lawbooks, from cases proclaiming breastfeeding “immaterial” to men,6 to statutes limiting breastfeeding protections and benefits to women only.7 Extensive public health
efforts to promote breastfeeding in the 1990s8 led to an explosion
of laws at the federal9 and state10 levels that regulate breastfeeding on the basis of sex. To cite just a few examples, laws from the
Affordable Care Act to the Fair Labor Standards Act require insurers to cover the cost of breastfeeding classes, but for women
only;11 mandate that workplace breastfeeding accommodations
be provided, but for women only;12 and provide protection
against ejection from public places on the basis of breastfeeding,
but, again, for women only.13
This sex-based regime regulating breastfeeding warrants
significant attention, as it sits in deep tension with the law’s
other efforts to avoid regulating parenting on the basis of sex.14
The Constitution’s sex equality guarantee aggressively scrutinizes laws that classify individuals by sex and that are premised
6. Martinez v. NBC, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (explaining that breastfeeding requires “the drawing of distinctions among persons of
one gender [women] on the basis of criteria that are immaterial to the other
[men]”).
7. See infra Part B.
8. See Anne L. Wright & Richard J. Schanler, The Resurgence of Breastfeeding at the End of the Second Millennium, 131 J. NUTRITION 421S, 423S
(2001).
9. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (requiring insurance coverage “with
respect to women” for breastfeeding support services); 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (requiring “[r]easonable break time for nursing mothers”); infra Parts IIB.1–3;
App. A.
10. See infra Part II.B; App. B–App. H.
11. See infra Part II.B.1.
12. See infra Part II.B.2; App. C.
13. See infra Part II.B.3; App. E.
14. Breastfeeding is the singular instance of post-birth parenting that has
escaped unsexing, but the law has also failed to unsex pregnancy. See David
Fontana & Naomi Schoenbaum, Unsexing Pregnancy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 309
(2019); Christine Emba, It’s Time to “Unsex” Pregnancy, WASH. POST (Apr. 3,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/its-time-to-unsex-pregnancy/
2019/04/03/5e876188-564e-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df_story.html [https://perma
.cc/T4P5-H4E6] (advocating for the “startlingly common-sensical” approach articulated in Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra). This Article builds upon Unsexing
Pregnancy, supra, to show that sex equality law has a reproduction exception,
encompassing both pregnancy and breastfeeding, that unjustifiably escapes unsexing on the false assumption that these reproductive features are based in
biology alone, when, in reality, they entail care work that can—and thus must—
be unsexed.
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in stereotypes.15 Nowhere have these efforts—what this Article
refers to as “unsexing”—been targeted more than at the care
work of parenting, where sex stereotypes “ha[ve] been . . . strongest.”16 Because sex rarely, if ever, dictates one’s ability to parent,
courts have consistently struck down laws that assign care work
to women and market work to men.17 This doctrine has been crucial for dismantling the legal infrastructure of “separate
spheres,” which for centuries pigeonholed women as caregivers
and men as breadwinners in ways so harmful to the cause of sex
equality.18 To police sex stereotypes in law, equal protection requires careful scrutiny of laws that regulate parenting on the
basis of sex.19 Other laws, like the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, bar private actors
from relying on these same stereotypes.20
By contrast, the law enshrines a view of breastfeeding as for
women only,21 and thus treats the care work associated with
breastfeeding as for women only, too.22 While it is typically
women who lactate,23 breastfeeding entails far more than the
15. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional
Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 88 (2010) (explaining that the
doctrine “dictated that the state could not act in ways that reflected or reinforced traditional conceptions of men’s and women’s roles”).
16. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003).
17. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“[T]he sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society.”); see also infra note 105 (discussing narrow exceptions to the constitutional prohibition on sex-based classifications).
18. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1185, 1204 n.124 (1992) (explaining that sex classifications “promoting the
woman’s ‘natural’ role as selfless homemaker, and correspondingly emphasizing the man’s role as provider . . . impede[ ] both men and women from pursuit
of the opportunities . . . that could enable them to break away from familiar
stereotypes”).
19. The large body of case law here is discussed in Part I.B, infra.
20. See infra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 890,
894 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (stating that “breast-feeding . . . is unique to women”);
Martinez v. NBC, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); infra
Part II.A.2.
22. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Hous. Funding II, Ltd., 717
F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that breastfeeding “clearly imposes
upon women a [workplace] burden that male employees need not—indeed, could
not—suffer”); infra Part II.A.2.
23. Some transgender men and nonbinary persons lactate. See Trevor MacDonald, Joy Noel-Weiss, Diana West, Michelle Walks, MaryLynne Biener,
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physical fact of lactation.24 Instead, breastfeeding is a social process that not only can involve men, but is improved by their involvement.25 The social process of breastfeeding includes a range
of care work, from purchasing a breast pump, to taking a breastfeeding class, to finding a lactation consultant, to feeding a baby
expressed breastmilk, that can be performed by any parent, regardless of sex. This breastfeeding care work is consistent with
the types of parenting care work that the Constitution has long
recognized can be—and thus must be—unsexed.26 That fathers
can play an integral role in breastfeeding is coming to be recognized in a wide range of places—academic literature,27 main-

Alanna Kibbe & Elizabeth Myler, Transmasculine Individuals’ Experiences
with Lactation, Chestfeeding, and Gender Identity: A Qualitative Study, 16 BMC
PREGNANCY & CHILDBIRTH 106, 107 (2016); infra notes 181–85 and accompanying text (discussing transgender men’s and nonbinary persons’ experiences with
lactation).
24. See infra Part II.A.1.
25. See infra note 135. Because the constitutional law doctrine on which
this Article’s analysis is premised assumes a sex binary, references to sex classifications are to the categories of women and men. However, the Article does
acknowledge the place of nonbinary people in this analysis. See, e.g., infra notes
368–72 and accompanying text. Future work confronts the assumption of a biological sex binary in equal protection doctrine. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Equal
Protection and the New Sex (Sept. 28, 2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Minnesota Law Review).
26. See infra Part II.A.1.
27. See, e.g., Harvinder Sihota, John Oliffe, Mary T. Kelly & Fairleth
McCuaig, Fathers’ Experiences and Perspectives of Breastfeeding: A Scoping Review, 13 AM. J. MEN’S HEALTH, 1, 2 (2019) (reviewing “a growing body of research studying fathers in the breastfeeding context that focuses on . . . interventions to assist fathers to fulfill their role as support providers to their
breastfeeding partners”); see Melissa Bartick, Elizabeth K. Stehel, Sarah L. Calhoun, Lori Feldman-Winter, Deena Zimmerman, Lawrence Noble, Casey RosenCarole, Laura R. Kair & The Acad. of Breastfeeding Med., Academy of Breastfeeding Medicine Position Statement and Guideline: Infant Feeding and Lactation-Related Language and Gender, 16 BREASTFEEDING MED. 587, 587–88
(2021) (adopting “desexed or gender-inclusive language” to “be inclusive of all
people”); sources cited infra note 137.
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stream media,28 parenting blogs,29 celebrity Twitter feeds,30 and
apps31—but, so far, not in law.
Despite the serious constitutional concern it generates, the
sexed law of breastfeeding has not been critiqued or even noticed. Like courts and lawmakers, feminist legal scholars have
assumed that breastfeeding is almost exclusively for women, and
thus have failed to appreciate how the law of breastfeeding can
and should be unsexed. The seminal scholarship on unsexing
parenting drew a line between pregnancy, which entails a real
physical difference, and parenting, which does not.32 In an effort
to avoid blurring this line, scholars in prior decades downplayed
breastfeeding, relegating it to a footnote.33 Today, breastfeeding
can no longer be so minimized. It is a leading topic in public

28. See, e.g., ABC News: Dad’s Photo Campaign for Breastfeeding Goes Viral (ABC television broadcast Apr. 2, 2014), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/
video/dads-photo-campaign-breastfeeding-goes-viral-23159783 [https://perma
.cc/QYR2-DUYK] (describing photography campaign aimed at raising awareness of the ways that men can support breastfeeding); Carl Cederstrom, Are We
Ready for the Breastfeeding Father?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/opinion/sunday/men-breastfeeding.html
[https://
perma.cc/9DD6-R2SQ] (discussing prospect of men breastfeeding); see infra
Part II.A.1.
29. See, e.g., The Fatherly Guide to Breastfeeding, FATHERLY [hereinafter
The Fatherly Guide], https://www.fatherly.com/breastfeeding-guide [https://
perma.cc/VXU3-DM8U]; infra Part II.A.1.
30. See, e.g., Ellen Wallwork, Dwayne ‘The Rock’ Johnson Shows Why
Teamwork Is Key to Breastfeeding, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www
.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/dwayne-the-rock-johnson-shows-breastfeeding
-teamwork_uk_5b1f98bfe4b09d7a3d76d820
[https://perma.cc/WWB7-TRQN]
(reporting on a Tweet showing an actor father feeding his partner a meal while
she is breastfeeding).
31. See Becky White, Roslyn C. Giglia, James A. White, Satvinder Dhaliwal, Sharyn K. Burns & Jane A. Scott, Gamifying Breastfeeding for Fathers:
Process Evaluation of the Milk Man Mobile App, 2 JMIR PEDIATRICS & PARENTING 1, 1 (2019) (evaluating the results of Milk Man, a father-focused breastfeeding app).
32. See infra notes 203–08 and accompanying text. Recent legal scholarship
also fails to recognize men’s role in breastfeeding. See, e.g., Meghan Boone, Lactation Law, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1827, 1829 n.7 (2018) (noting that transgender
men can lactate but otherwise treating breastfeeding as for women, and arguing
that this area of law reinforces sex stereotypes by how it regulates the appropriate role of mothers, not by its failure to include men).
33. See infra note 204.
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health,34 a key feature of early childhood,35 and a core subject of
the law regulating parenting.36
This Article exposes the sexed law of breastfeeding, reveals
its marked contrast with the law’s otherwise pervasive efforts to
unsex parenting, and explores how to resolve this divide in sex
equality law.37 Breastfeeding is a central and growing part of the
care of many infants.38 Unsexing breastfeeding is crucial because the stereotypes of women as caregivers and men as breadwinners that undergird these laws are a key barrier to sex equality.39 Unsexing such a critical part of caregiving is necessary to
ensure that mothers are not assigned the role of primary caregiver, with fathers as mere back-ups—sticky roles that are hard
to reverse.40 And because sex-stereotypical laws impact not only
the behavior of their intended beneficiaries, but also the behavior of regulated entities—namely employers—sexed breastfeeding laws can reinforce “generalizations” about the proper roles of

34. See OFF. OF THE SURGEON GEN. The Surgeon General’s Call to Action to
Support Breastfeeding, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2011) [hereinafter CALL TO ACTION], https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK52682/pdf/
Bookshelf_NBK52682.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EMQ-X2LM].
35. See Global Strategy For Infant And Young Child, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
& UNICEF 7–8 (2003), https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9241562218
[https://perma.cc/9QX8-S5RG] (emphasizing the impact of feeding practices on
young children and recommending exclusive breastfeeding for first six months).
36. See infra Part II.B; App. A–App. H.
37. This Article is, at its heart, doctrinal. It takes its normative stance—
unsexing parenting—as the dictate of the Equal Protection Clause, and applies
that stance to the law of breastfeeding. While one could critique the goal of promoting breastfeeding that is at the root of many sexed breastfeeding laws, see
infra notes 441–42 and accompanying text, this Article takes as given the policy
ends of the laws it interrogates, and applies constitutional scrutiny to these
laws, evaluating how they should be unsexed under the current constitutional
mandate.
38. Compare Breastfeeding Report Card, CDC (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/
breastfeeding/data/reportcard.htm [https://perma.cc/S6UR-UV2R] (documenting that in the United States in 2017, 84.1% of infants breastfed at birth, and
58.3% of infants were breastfeeding at six months), with Wright & Schanler,
supra note 8, at 421S (documenting that in the United States in 1997, 62.4% of
infants breastfed at birth, and 26% of infants were breastfeeding at six months).
39. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (“These
mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination
that forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver,
and fostered employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work
and their value as employees.”).
40. See infra Part A.
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women and men,41 even in families that choose not to breastfeed.
The pervasive sexing of breastfeeding thus risks re-erecting the
legal edifice of separate spheres that the law has spent decades
dismantling.
The sexed law of breastfeeding not only undermines equality between women and men, but also equality for gay, lesbian,
transgender, and nonbinary parents, and parents of color. Those
who do not identify as women, including some nonbinary persons42 and transgender men,43 can lactate, but they are excluded
from a law that distributes its protections and benefits to women
alone.44 The sexed law of breastfeeding also excludes gay men
from its reach, and excludes lesbian partners to the extent that
it applies only to “breastfeeding women” rather than to women
generally.45 Finally, the sexed law of breastfeeding reduces the
support that the law provides for breastfeeding, disproportionately impacting families of color, who have lower breastfeeding
rates, and thus need more, rather than less, support.46
Resolving the divide between the sexed law of breastfeeding
and the unsexed law of parenting requires no great leap. The
tools for doing so can be found in existing sex equality precedents. While it has long been clear that laws cannot rely on sex
when physical sex differences are irrelevant,47 the Supreme
Court has more recently applied equal protection’s exacting gaze
to areas where physical sex differences are at play. In cases like
United States v. Virginia48 and Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs,49 the Court has required that any law’s reliance on sex extend no further than necessary in light of the relevant physical difference.50 The answer to remedying the sexed
law of breastfeeding, then, is to extend the close scrutiny that
41. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (forbidding reliance
on “generalizations” on the basis of sex).
42. See Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894,
896–97 (2019) (discussing how some states now allow a nonbinary sex designation on a birth certificate).
43. See MacDonald et al., supra note 23, at 106.
44. See infra notes 369–74 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 375–83 and accompanying text.
46. See CALL TO ACTION supra note 34, at 7 (reporting that in 2007, breastfeeding rates of Black infants were about fifty percent lower than those of white
infants); infra notes 384–90 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
48. 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
49. 538 U.S. 721, 724–25 (2003).
50. See infra notes 394–403 and accompanying text.
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equal protection doctrine already applies to other sexed parenting laws, and to invalidate those sex classifications that are not
justified by a physical sex difference.51
This Article then evaluates whether the appropriate remedy
for constitutionally infirm breastfeeding regulations would be to
“level down” by scrapping the invalidated provision, or to “level
up” by extending breastfeeding protections and benefits to all
parents.52 Any parent, regardless of sex, can meaningfully utilize
many breastfeeding protections and benefits.53 Providing breastfeeding protections and benefits to all parents, regardless of sex,
will further the law’s goal of eradicating sex stereotypes.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Parts I and II contrast
the law’s otherwise pervasive scrutiny of sex-based rules in parenting with the law’s acquiescence to sex-based rules in breastfeeding. Part III demonstrates that the law’s distinct treatment
of breastfeeding is unjustified. The sexed law of breastfeeding,
like other sexed parenting regulations, reinforces a gendered distribution of labor at home and in the market, contrary to the
goals of sex equality law.54 While breastfeeding involves the body
in a way that parenting typically does not, this fact does not support breastfeeding’s unique legal treatment, because many
breastfeeding regulations do not implicate the body at all. Part
IV suggests how to resolve the tension that the sexed law of
breastfeeding generates in sex equality law. This Part explains
how current case law can be read to resolve the tension, and details how courts should do so.
I. UNSEXING PARENTING
One of the primary aims of sex discrimination law is unsexing: if sex need not determine one’s ability because of a real dif-

51. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690, 1693
(2017) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (explaining that
when legislatures “[p]rescrib[e] one rule for mothers, another for fathers . . .
heightened scrutiny is in order” because “[l]aws according or denying benefits
in reliance on stereotypes about women’s domestic roles . . . create a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination”).
52. See, e.g., id. at 1698 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[W]hen a statute benefits one class . . . and excludes another . . . [a] court may either . . . order
that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit,
or it may extend the coverage of the statute . . . .”).
53. See infra Parts II.A.1 and B.
54. See infra Part I for a discussion of the relevant constitutional and statutory sex equality law and its goals.
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ference between the sexes, then sex should not be made to determine one’s ability by law.55 The central target of the law of unsexing is care work within the family. Dictating sex roles within
the family has devastating consequences for sex equality outside
of it, particularly at work.56 Applying heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has decided
that women are not better suited for care work than men, and
that laws assuming they are reinforce sex stereotypes that cabin
women’s roles at work and men’s roles in the family.57 Beyond
equal protection scrutiny, the law unsexes parenting with legislation aimed at abolishing sex-based roles in the family and at
work.58 This Part addresses why and how the law generally unsexes parenting.
A. WHY WE UNSEX PARENTING
Before it adopted unsexing as its goal, the law relegated the
sexes to separate spheres: “[i]t was man’s lot, because of his nature, to be breadwinner, head of household, representative of the
family outside the home; and it was woman’s lot, because of her
nature, not only to bear, but also to raise children, and keep the
home in order.”59 Under rational basis review, the bar was low
for justifying the range of sex-based laws that undergirded this
separate-spheres ideology.60 The Supreme Court upheld these
55. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973) (recognizing
that “statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members”).
56. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003)
(“[T]he faultline between work and family[ ] [is] precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains strongest . . . .”).
57. See id. at 736 (“These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a selffulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the
role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views
about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.”); see infra
note 106 (collecting cases).
58. See infra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
59. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women Becoming Part of the Constitution, 6 LAW & INEQ. 17, 19 (1988); see also Sessions v. Morales-Santana,
137 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2017) (referring to “an era when the Nation’s lawbooks
were rife with overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are”).
60. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58–62 (1961) (allowing a state
law that made women’s jury service voluntary because women’s place was at
“the center of home and family life”); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465–67
(1948) (permitting a state law that no women except wives and daughters of
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laws on the basis of “belief”61 that there is “a wide difference in
the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.”62
As for the domestic sphere, constitutional law long appreciated that parenting is work, but work that was the domain of
women. Parenting involved two aspects—“home [life]” and “family life”63—with “women’s place at ‘the center’” of both.64 “Family
life” entailed a range of childcare responsibilities, from physical
maintenance and supervision,65 to moral education,66 to emotional bonding with the child.67 The Court has also pointed to an
administrative component of care work: things like keeping grocery lists, registering children for school, and doing family paperwork.68 All of these aspects of care work that were part of
tavern owners could tend bar); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416–17, 423
(1908) (validating a state law restricting women’s work hours); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well
as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.”).
61. Muller, 208 U.S. at 420 (explaining that the “widespread belief that
woman’s physical structure, and the functions she performs in consequence
thereof,” supports legislation limiting women’s work hours); accord Goesaert,
335 U.S. at 466–67 (upholding sex classification on the basis of “entertainable”
legislative “belief ”).
62. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“Man is,
or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life.”).
63. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62; see also Muller, 208 U.S. at 419–23, 419 n.1 (holding that a state law limiting women’s work hours was permissible in part due
to women’s role in “the rearing . . . of the children,” and “the maintenance of the
home”).
64. Ginsburg, supra note 59, at 19 (setting forth women’s twin domestic
duties as “rais[ing] children[ ] and keep[ing] the home in order”).
65. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1975) (addressing the
significance of “care” and “custody” of children).
66. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 419 n.1 (listing “education of the children” as a
woman’s responsibility).
67. See Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 652 (addressing “companionship” of children); id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasizing “personal care and
attention” of a parent).
68. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting the “management”
aspects of parenting); Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 62 (assigning women to the “center of
home and family life,” indicating that they run the domestic sphere); Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added) (referring to the “noble and benign offices of wife and
mother,” and thus pointing to the administrative features of these roles). See
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maintaining “the domestic sphere” were deemed to “properly belong[] to the domain and functions of womanhood.”69
The equality principle at the heart of the Equal Protection
Clause—treat likes alike—dismantled separate spheres.70 In the
1970s, the Supreme Court came to appreciate men and women
as likes (or at least potential likes) in many, if not most, aspects
of care work. Because much of the work of parenting is not biologically or otherwise necessarily sexed, women and men were
equally capable of doing the work of the domestic sphere.71 This,
coupled with the recognition that the legal assignment of roles
in the family by sex undermined sex equality, brought about the
constitutional unsexing revolution, with heightened scrutiny applied to sex classifications to rid the law of sex stereotypical regulations.72
The Court applied these twin principles—that work and
family roles need not be assigned by sex, and that doing so did
distinct damage to the cause of sex equality—in the “most critical”73 of its early sex discrimination cases, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.74 In that case, a father whose wife had passed away challenged a provision of the Social Security Act that granted
benefits to mothers upon the death of a husband but not to fathers upon the death of a wife.75 The challenged rule was meant
“to permit women to elect not to work and to devote themselves
to the care of children” following the death of their husbands.76
generally Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1412–17 (2015) (defining “admin” as “the office-type work that people do to manage their lives”).
69. See Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“The
harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should
belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a
distinct and independent career from that of her husband.”).
70. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–
42 (1985) (acknowledging that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that “all
persons similarly situated should be treated alike”).
71. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“[T]he sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”).
72. See Ginsburg, supra note 59, at 20 (“To turn in a new direction [of sexequality law], the Court first had to comprehend that legislation apparently designed to benefit or protect women could often, perversely, have the opposite
effect.”).
73. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause, 9
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 43 (1986).
74. 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975).
75. Id. at 637–41.
76. Id. at 648.
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The Court invalidated the rule, acknowledging that men and
women are similarly situated in their ability to care for children,
and that the longstanding assumption to the contrary was not
grounded in any biological or other necessity.77 Remarkably, the
Court reached this conclusion in the context of a mother who had
died in childbirth,78 thereby recognizing fathers as caregivers
equal to mothers from the moment of birth.79
The Court recognized that mothers and fathers were equally
capable parents, and that sex stereotypical laws assuming otherwise generated distinct harms. Laws treating similarly situated mothers and fathers differently, like the one at issue in
Weinberger, are part of “a much broader pattern of sex-role enforcement that associate[s] men with the marketplace and
women with the home.”80 Such laws are so troubling because
they reinforce these stereotypes. If stay-at-home dads are not
granted benefits when their working wives die, they will choose
not to stay at home, and their wives will instead assume this
role.81 As then-Judge Ginsburg well explained, sex stereotypical
regulations “enshrining and promoting the woman’s ‘natural’
role as homemaker, and correspondingly emphasizing the man’s
role as provider . . . impeded both men and women from pursuit
of the very opportunities that would have enabled them to break
away from familiar stereotypes.”82
The notion that sex-based laws would reinforce sex stereotypes in this way was no idle concern, as demonstrated by a host
of sex-based laws premised on this separate spheres ideology.83
For example, state laws excluded women from working in certain
77. See id. at 652–53.
78. Id. at 639.
79. The Court made no mention of breastfeeding, see id., consistent with
the judicial silence on this topic in constitutional sex-equality cases, see infra
notes 186–96 and accompanying text.
80. Franklin, supra note 15, at 124; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (explaining that the “practical effect” of sex stereotypical
laws was to “put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage”).
81. This analysis relies on a heterosexual family structure, the only one
legally recognized at the time. See infra Part III.C for the harms of sexing parenting roles for other families.
82. Ginsburg, supra note 59, at 21; see also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S.
76, 89 (1979) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 n.15 (1975)) (noting that sex-based rules reflect and reinforce stereotypes that women are at “the
center of home and family life”).
83. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729 (2003) (cataloguing these laws).
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occupations, like law84 or bartending,85 or in excess of a set number of hours.86 By circumscribing where and when women could
work, these laws not only reflected the notion that women’s
proper place was in the home, but made it far more likely to be
so. These stereotypes have helped to generate a world in which
“the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on
women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of
women more than it affects the working lives of men.”87 Indeed,
Congress has placed the blame for women’s narrower field of
work opportunities on “the pervasive presumption that women
are mothers first, and workers second,” which has engendered
“discrimination against women when they are mothers,”88 depressing women’s pay, benefits, and job security.89
Stereotypical sex classifications “creat[e] a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination”90 not only by circumscribing women’s roles,
but by circumscribing men’s roles too. By “presuming a lack of
domestic responsibilities for men,” these types of sex-based laws
not only push women into domestic roles, but also pull men out
of the domestic sphere and into the workplace.91 Just a few years
ago, the Supreme Court made clear that “such laws may disserve
men who exercise responsibility for raising their children.”92 Stereotyping men as workers hurts women, too, by encouraging

84. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 131 (1873).
85. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948).
86. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 416–17 (1908).
87. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728 n.2 (2003) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5)).
88. Id. at 736 (quoting The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint
Hearing on H.R. 4300 Before the Subcomm. on Lab.-Mgmt. Relations and the
Subcomm. on Lab. Standards of the H. Comm. On Educ. & Lab., 99th Cong. 100
(1986) (statement of Women’s Legal Defense Fund)).
89. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212 (1977) (holding that employee benefits “must be distributed according to classifications which do not
without sufficient justification differentiate among covered employees solely on
the basis of sex,” notwithstanding the argument that widows might be “needier”
than widowers “because of job discrimination against women”).
90. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017) (alteration
in original) (quoting Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736).
91. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (“Because employers continued to regard the
family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men similar accommodations
or discouraged them from taking leave.”).
92. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693.
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women further into family roles (and away from work),93 and by
continuing to devalue these family roles.94
Finally, sex stereotypes become self-reinforcing not only by
their effect on regulated individuals, but by their effect on third
parties. For example, laws premised on sex stereotypes can have
an impact on employers. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Hibbs, state laws that provided family leave only to women cemented “employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.”95 Congress has
acknowledged that these sex stereotypes create “serious potential for encouraging employers to discriminate against [female]
employees and applicants.”96
B. HOW WE UNSEX PARENTING
As a matter of blackletter law, intermediate scrutiny is the
means by which the Equal Protection Clause goes about unsexing. A law that classifies on the basis of sex can survive intermediate scrutiny when the government demonstrates that the law
aims to advance an important government interest by means
that are substantially related to that interest.97 When it comes
to constitutional sex discrimination claims, though, the jurisprudence is best understood in terms of stereotypes, not scrutiny.98
93. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (acknowledging that employers’ refusal to
extend caregiving leave to men “forced women to continue to assume the role of
primary family caregiver”).
94. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105
YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995) (“So long as stereotypically feminine behavior,” including
“nurturing or raising children, is forced into a female ghetto, it may continue to
be devalued.”).
95. 538 U.S. at 736.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6).
97. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Court has alternatively described intermediate scrutiny as demanding an “exceedingly persuasive” justification. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
98. See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1447, 1449 (2000) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685
(1973)) (arguing that “the components of the intermediate scrutiny standard . . .
have rarely been the moving parts in a Supreme Court sex discrimination decision,” and that “the bulk of the work in these decisions . . . [is] the proposition
that there are constitutional objections to ‘gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes’”); Franklin, supra note 15, at 138 n.296 (stating that “[t]he
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The Supreme Court has unanimously agreed that “[o]verbroad
generalizations” about the sexes run afoul of equal protection,
even if these generalizations are true in “many” situations.99
Professor Mary Anne Case has explained how rigorously this
rule has been applied: “[T]he assumption at the root of the sexrespecting rule must be true of either all women or no women or
all men or no men; there must be a zero or a hundred on one side
of the sex equation or the other.”100 This means that while the
doctrine of sex discrimination is intermediate scrutiny, it can in
fact be quite strict.101
Across the range of sex-based laws subject to heightened
scrutiny under this doctrine, parenting has been seen as the
most important area to unsex because “the faultline between
work and family” is “precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains strongest.”102 The Supreme Court has
consistently invalidated sex classifications related to “family duties,”103 because these classifications are not grounded in any
physical sex differences, but instead simply reflect stereotypes
about men’s and women’s proper roles in the home and the market.104
When courts scrutinize sex-based laws, it is generally only
laws grounded in “[p]hysical differences between men and
anti-stereotyping principle . . . shap[es] what constitutes an important interest
and what means qualify as sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve this interest”
and documenting that “the Court has never upheld a sex classification after
determining that it reflects or reinforces sex stereotypes”).
99. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692–93 (2017) (“Overbroad generalizations . . . have a constraining impact, descriptive though they
may be of the way many people still order their lives.”); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994) (“[G]ender classifications that
rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even
when some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization.”); Case,
supra note 98, at 1450 (“[V]irtually every sex-respecting rule struck down by
the Court in the last quarter century embodied a proxy that was overwhelmingly, though not perfectly, accurate.”).
100. Case, supra note 98, at 1449–50.
101. See id. at 1453 (“The perfect proxy test has always had the capacity to
be more strict even than strict scrutiny.”).
102. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003).
103. Id. at 730, 736 (collecting cases); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 652 (1975) (recognizing that working men and women “will encounter
the same child-care related problems”).
104. See Ginsburg, supra note 59, at 23–24 (noting that “[t]he framework
evolving at the time of the Wiesenfeld case . . . has enabled the Supreme Court
effectively to break the hold of the breadwinner-homemaker dichotomy . . . .”).
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women” that will pass constitutional muster.105 A sex classification that is not justified by a physical sex difference is typically
verboten.106 When there is no inevitable connection between sex
and the classification, such a classification amounts to a mere
stereotype.107 This does not mean the Equal Protection Clause
gives a pass to sex classifications when physical differences between the sexes are relevant. These classifications must still be
scrutinized to ensure that the physical difference justifies the
law’s reliance on sex.
In United States v. Virginia, the Court applied these principles in a challenge to the male-only admissions policy at Virginia
Military Institute (VMI), a state-run military academy.108 Even
though men could, on average, more easily attain the academy’s
required “[p]hysical rigor” than women,109 the Court still struck

105. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). Two other circumstances have historically justified sex classifications: (1) when sex classifications are “used to compensate women ‘for particular economic disabilities [they
have] suffered’”; and (2) when another sex-respecting classification not before
the Court results in a perfect proxy between sex and the challenged classification. Case, supra note 98, at 1457–58 (alteration in original) (quoting Virginia,
518 U.S. at 533). However, these justifications have not been relied on in decades.
106. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686, 1700–01
(2017) (invalidating a sex-based rule for determining citizenship); Wengler v.
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 143–46, 152 (1980) (invalidating a law
affording workers’ compensation benefits automatically to widows but not to
widowers); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 78, 89 (1979) (invalidating a law
that granted benefits to children of unemployed fathers but not unemployed
mothers); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385–87, 394 (1979) (invalidating
a law that permitted unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, to prevent the
adoption of a child by denying consent); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270, 283 (1979)
(invalidating a law that granted alimony to women only); Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199, 216–17 (1977) (invalidating a law that afforded Social Security
benefits to widows automatically but required widowers to show dependence);
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15–17 (1975) (invalidating a law affording boys
more years of parental support on the assumption that girls would marry); Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 642–45, 653 (invalidating a law granting Social Security
survivors’ benefits to widows, but not widowers, with minor children); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (invalidating a legal presumption that unwed fathers would be unfit parents); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688–
91 (1973) (invalidating a law granting benefits automatically to wives, but not
husbands, of servicemembers).
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108. 518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996).
109. Id. at 522 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766
F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991)).
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down the policy.110 The Court recognized that physical sex differences could, in theory, justify excluding women,111 but would
not do so unless no women could meet VMI’s admissions criteria.112 Because some women could pass this bar, seven justices
deemed the all-male policy unconstitutional.113
Critically, the Court then extended Virginia’s careful scrutiny of sex-based laws to unsex parenting, even in the presence
of physical sex differences related to reproduction.114 In Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, a decision authored
by Chief Justice Rehnquist—no great advocate of sex equality115—the Court recognized that fathers and mothers might be
differently situated with regard to “the period of physical disability due to pregnancy and childbirth.”116 But greater post-birth
leave granted to mothers and not fathers that is “not attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women” would
be constitutionally barred as premised in and furthering the
“pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is
women’s work.”117 So, in the face of the physical difference of

110. Id. at 558.
111. See id. at 533 (“Physical differences between men and women . . . are
enduring . . . .”).
112. See id. at 550–51 (noting that “a remedy must be crafted” for the women
who are capable of meeting the requirements imposed on VMI cadets).
113. See id. at 558 (Thomas, J., taking no part in the decision); id. at 566–67
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730–31 (2003) (crediting Congress’s finding that the “pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for
family members is women’s work” enforced the gendered breadwinner-homemaker dichotomy). Hibbs addressed whether the FMLA abrogated state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment such that a state
employee could sue her state employer under the statute. See id. at 726. This
required the Court to evaluate the reach of the Amendment’s first Section, as
Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 extends only to laws remedying
or deterring conduct that violates Section 1. See id. at 727–30 (“[T]he persistence of . . . unconstitutional discrimination by the States justifies Congress’
passage of prophylactic § 5 legislation.”).
115. See Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New
Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1872
(2006) (indicating that Rehnquist was “a vocal critic of the Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence” and an opponent of the Equal Rights Amendment).
116. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731 n.4 (citing evidence that the average physical
recovery period after childbirth is four to eight weeks).
117. Id. at 731.
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childbirth, equal protection requires unsexing any care work unrelated to this difference.118
More recently, the Court expanded the bounds of unsexing
parenting with its recognition of the right to same-sex marriage.119 At the same time that the Constitution policed laws enforcing sex roles in the family, sex-based parenting roles continued to serve as a reason for denying same-sex marriage.120
Recognizing the right to same-sex marriage meant renouncing
the idea that having parents of different sexes was necessary (or
even necessarily beneficial).121 If, as a matter of federal constitutional law, two men or two women can be just as good parents
as a man and a woman, the separation of sex from parenting is
well-nigh complete.
Beyond equal protection doctrine, statutes that operate at
the “faultline between work and family” seek to unsex parenting
as well.122 Title VII’s123 ban on workplace sex discrimination prohibits employers from acting on the basis of sex stereotypes
about caregiving responsibilities, either assuming that women
are less competent workers because of their family responsibilities, or that men are less competent caregivers because of their
work responsibilities.124 And when the guarantee of formal
equality under the Constitution and statutes like Title VII fell
short in unsexing parenting, Congress responded by enacting
the FMLA.125 As the Supreme Court made clear, “[b]y setting a
118. For more on this jurisprudence focusing on recent case law, see generally Cary Franklin, Biological Warfare: Constitutional Conflict over “Inherent
Differences” Between the Sexes, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 169 (2017).
119. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675–76 (2015).
120. See Case, supra note 98, at 1487–88 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)) (“[P]rohibitions on homosexuality rely on stereotypes in the sense that they are based on ‘fixed notions concerning the roles
and abilities of men and women.’”).
121. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 668 (recognizing that “gays and lesbians can
create loving, supportive families”).
122. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738.
123. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
124. See Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers
with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N
(2007), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html [https://perma.cc/
678W-PRNM] (indicating that Title VII outlaws “sex-based disparate treatment
of female caregivers, focusing on sex-based stereotypes,” and “sex-based disparate treatment of male caregivers, such as the denial of childcare leave that is
available to female workers”).
125. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737–38 (discussing how the FMLA was needed
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minimum standard of family leave for all eligible employees, irrespective of gender,” the FMLA “attacks the formerly statesanctioned stereotype that only women are responsible for family caregiving, thereby reducing employers’ incentives to engage
in discrimination by basing hiring and promotion decisions on
stereotypes.”126 While the goal of unsexing parenting may not yet
be fulfilled, it has been the aim of sex-equality law for decades.
II. SEXING BREASTFEEDING
Despite the constitutional mandate to unsex the care work
of parenting, courts and commentators have overlooked the care
work associated with breastfeeding that can, and thus must, be
unsexed. Cases view breastfeeding as a biological event only, or
a social event derivative of that biological event, and scholars
mostly concur.127 Coupled with public health efforts to promote
breastfeeding, the result is a burgeoning area of facially sex-discriminatory breastfeeding laws that cover both lactation and
care work. Even though these sexed regulations exist at “the
faultline between work and family,”128 neither judges nor scholars have noted the tension with the doctrine set forth in Part I
that mandates unsexing care work.
This Part first explains why we sex breastfeeding, setting
forth the sex-equality jurisprudence of breastfeeding and how it
exists in tension with the sex-equality jurisprudence of parenting. This law of breastfeeding does not recognize the care work
that is part of breastfeeding.129 Even when it is noticed, the care
work of breastfeeding is seen as inevitably bundled with sex, and
thus breastfeeding inevitably reinforces women’s role as caregivers.130 This Part then explains how we sex breastfeeding, cataloguing the rules of breastfeeding that rely on sex classifications,
and showing how the same rules are sex-neutral with regard to
other aspects of care work. Rather than exhausting the realm of

to remedy the sex unequal distribution of home and market work because formal equality statutes like Title VII did not).
126. Id. at 737.
127. See infra Part II.A.2.
128. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738.
129. See infra notes 186–96 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 197–202 and accompanying text.
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sexed breastfeeding laws, this catalogue highlights key examples of the most important rules that make up the sexed law of
breastfeeding.131
A. WHY WE SEX BREASTFEEDING
The constitutional mandate to unsex parenting stems from
the idea that a host of “family duties” need not be—and thus
should not be—assigned on the basis of sex.132 This reasoning
should extend to many facets of breastfeeding, notwithstanding
the physical fact of lactation that typically divides mothers and
fathers. These substantial “family duties”133 can be performed
regardless of whether a parent is lactating and thus can be disaggregated from sex. Yet the law has failed to notice this breastfeeding care work. This Section first offers a typology of the substantial nonbiological care work that breastfeeding entails,
which is the kind of care work that equal protection has required
to be unsexed. It then shows how the law renders breastfeeding
care work invisible by treating breastfeeding as a biological
event exclusive to women.
1. Breastfeeding as Care Work in Life
Breastfeeding is typically thought of as a simple matter of
lactation. But sources from economists134 to parenting blogs135
recognize that breastfeeding is not a natural and costless phenomenon. Rather, successful breastfeeding depends on substantial investments in capital and expenditures of labor that are

131. A more complete, though still not exhaustive, list of sexed breastfeeding
laws can be found in the Appendices to this Article.
132. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 (noting that “stereotype-based beliefs about the
allocation of family duties . . . and employers’ reliance on them in establishing
discriminatory policies” merits legislative correction and heightened judicial
scrutiny).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Pinka Chatterji & Kevin D. Frick, Does Returning to Work After Childbirth Affect Breastfeeding Practices?, 3 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 315,
318 (2005) (explaining the working mother’s cost/benefits analysis of breastfeeding).
135. See, e.g., Ross Hunt, 5 Ways Dads Can Help with Breastfeeding, TODAY’S PARENT (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.todaysparent.com/family/parenting/
ways-dads-can-help-with-breastfeeding [https://perma.cc/JE5F-K9A2] (explaining how fathers can help ease the burden on breastfeeding mothers); The Fatherly Guide, supra note 29 (same).
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separate and apart from lactation.136 With the exception of lactation, acquiring breastfeeding capital and performing breastfeeding labor can be done by any parent, regardless of sex.137
Parents can acquire breastfeeding capital, which can be
physical, human, or social. As for physical capital, breastfeeding
often entails acquiring goods such as a nursing pillow, nursing
bras, nipple cream, and more.138 A breast pump and associated
accessories139 are important not only for those who at least sometimes expect to be apart from their breastfeeding baby, but also
for babies who won’t latch to the breast.140 Parents can research

136. See infra notes 137–80 and accompanying text.
137. There is a burgeoning academic literature on father involvement in
breastfeeding. Sihota et al., supra note 27, at 2 (noting and reviewing this “growing” literature). Some studies focus on how father involvement in breastfeeding
increases breastfeeding rates. See, e.g., Jennifer Abbass-Dick, Hilary K. Brown,
Kimberley T. Jackson, Lynn Rempel & Cindy-Lee Dennis, Perinatal Breastfeeding Interventions Including Fathers/Partners: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 75 MIDWIFERY 41, 49 (2019) (reviewing research finding that prenatal
breastfeeding education for fathers increases breastfeeding in partners); Alfredo Pisacane, Grazia Isabella Continisio, Maria Aldinucci, Stefania D’Amora
& Paola Continisio, A Controlled Trial of the Father’s Role in Breastfeeding Promotion, 116 PEDIATRICS 494, 494 (2005) (finding that father breastfeeding education substantially increased the rate at which fathers provided support
(ninety-one percent versus thirty-four percent)). Other studies focus on the various ways fathers can be involved in breastfeeding. See, e.g., Nigel Sherriff, Valerie Hall & Christina Panton, Engaging and Supporting Fathers to Promote
Breast Feeding: A Concept Analysis, 30 MIDWIFERY 667, 667 (2014) (providing
the following typology of father breastfeeding support: “(1) knowledge about
breast feeding; (2) positive attitude to breast feeding; (3) involvement in the decision-making process; (4) practical support; and (5) emotional support”); Lynn
A. Rempel & John K. Rempel, The Breastfeeding Team: The Role of Involved
Fathers in the Breastfeeding Family, 27 J. HUM. LACTATION 115, 117–19 (2011)
(cataloguing ways fathers can be involved in breastfeeding).
138. See, e.g., Haley Jena, Breastfeeding Products for New Moms, WHAT
TO
EXPECT, https://www.whattoexpect.com/baby-products/nursing-feeding/
breastfeeding-essentials-new-moms [https://perma.cc/RU9X-LRJT] (last updated Feb. 10, 2021) (cataloguing breastfeeding supplies).
139. See, e.g., Breast Milk Store and Feed Set, MEDELA, https://www.medela
.com/breastfeeding/products/accessories/store-and-feed-set
[https://perma.cc/
BJ66-3MS5].
140. See KAREN WAMBACH & BECKY SPENCER, BREASTFEEDING AND HUMAN
LACTATION 249, 253 (6th ed. 2021). Pumping can also be a way to maintain or
increase milk supply. See id. at 365.
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and acquire this physical capital141 and do the associated administrative work, like determining insurance coverage for these
products.142
Some breastfeeding products will be used exclusively by the
lactating parent (for example, a nursing bra).143 Other products
can be used by either parent (for example, a breastfeeding
book).144 Even products that seem inherently sexed may not be.
For example, a breastfeeding pillow can be used not only by the
lactating parent while breastfeeding, but by either parent when
giving the baby a bottle.145 Regardless of which parent will use
these products, any parent can research the products and acquire them.
As for human capital, all parents can learn skills for performing breastfeeding care work.146 As volumes of breastfeeding
141. The transaction costs can run high given the array of products on the
market. See, e.g., Breast Pump Buying Guide, CONSUMER REPS., https://www
.consumerreports.org/cro/breast-pumps/buying-guide/index.htm [https://perma
.cc/T4LF-AW6G] (last updated May 24, 2016]; Nursing Bra Buying Guide, CONSUMER REPS., https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/nursing-bras/buying-guide/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/MPT5-7URC] (last updated May 24, 2016).
142. The Affordable Care Act requires insurers to cover the cost of only
certain types of breast pumps. See Healthcare Benefits & Coverage: Breastfeeding Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/coverage/breast
-feeding-benefits [https://perma.cc/N6CR-Q6PF] (indicating variation on “manual or electric, the length of the rental, and when you’ll receive it (before or after
birth)”). For the gendered distribution of this type of administrative work, see
generally Emens, supra note 68, at 1409.
143. See Nursing Bra Buying Guide, supra note 141. The law sexes breastfeeding, but this Article does not. Transgender men and nonbinary persons can
lactate. The non-lactating parent can be a mother. Therefore, rather than assuming that mothers lactate and fathers do not, this Article uses gender-neutral
terms where appropriate.
144. See, e.g., KATHLEEN HUGGINS, THE NURSING MOTHER’S COMPANION
(7th ed. 2015); LA LECHE LEAGUE, THE WOMANLY ART OF BREASTFEEDING (8th
ed. 2010). While this Article focuses on law, these titles make clear that it is not
law alone that sexes (or, with terms like “womanly,” genders) breastfeeding.
145. See Carrie Noriega, How to Use a Breast Feeding Pillow, WIKIHOW,
https://www.wikihow.com/Use-a-Breast-Feeding-Pillow
[https://perma.cc/
BW46-7GL6] (last updated Feb. 17, 2022). Federal law assumes that only
breastfeeding women use nursing pillows. See 16 C.F.R. § 1500.86(b)(9) (2021)
(exempting from classification as a banned toy “nursing pillows that are designed to be used only as a nursing aide for breastfeeding mothers”).
146. The difference between a supportive partner and an unsupportive partner turns precisely on whether the partner has the knowledge and skills required to provide breastfeeding assistance. See, e.g., Pisacane et al., supra note
137, at 494 (finding that teaching fathers how to prevent and manage lactation
difficulties substantially increased the rate at which fathers provided support).
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books reveal,147 there is a lot to learn about breastfeeding. Parents can learn about breastfeeding generally, such as how often
babies need to eat, what it looks like when a baby is swallowing,
the role of the baby in milk letdown, and so on.148 Parents can
learn how to use the physical capital associated with breastfeeding, like how to set up the breastpump and how to store breastmilk.149 Parents can learn the mechanics of breastfeeding,150 like
different positions151 and proper latch.152 Parents can attend
breastfeeding classes,153 and there are breastfeeding classes
aimed specifically at non-lactating parents, which I refer to as
partners,154 in recognition of the role that any parent can play in
breastfeeding.155
147. See, e.g., Best Sellers in Breastfeeding, AMAZON, https://www.amazon
.com/gp/bestsellers/digital-text/157607011 [https://perma.cc/L77M-UTT5] (listing one hundred bestselling breastfeeding books).
148. See Hunt, supra note 135 (reporting that he “learned all about cluster
feeding, the baby’s role in letdown and the importance of nipple cream”); 8 Ways
Dad Can Support a Nursing Mom, BRAVADO! DESIGNS [hereinafter 8 Ways],
https://bravadodesigns.com/blogs/the-thread/144995143-8-ways-dad-can
-support-a-nursing-mom [https://perma.cc/PM9Y-UFEW] (suggesting that dads
learn “how breastfeeding works—what it looks like when a baby is swallowing,
rather than just resting at the breast”).
149. See The Fatherly Guide, supra note 29 (noting that non-lactating parents can help by learning “breastfeeding aids mom uses, like pumps or nipple
shields” and researching “breastmilk storage guidelines”).
150. On the unique contributions non-lactating parents can make here, see
infra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
151. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 224 (indicating the five
most common positions as “cradle hold, cross-cradle hold, football hold, sidelying, and prone position”).
152. Id. (“Latch-on refers to the ability of the newborn to grasp the nipple,
flange the upper and lower lips outward against the breast areola, and remain
firmly on the breast between bursts of suckling.”); id. at 251 (noting that “[a]
deep latch ensures full drainage of the milk stored in the breast,” whereas an
improper latch can result in “nipple pain and damage” and reduced milk flow).
153. See Mayo Clinic Staff, Breast-Feeding Support: How a Partner
Can Help, MAYO CLINIC (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy
-lifestyle/labor-and-delivery/in-depth/breastfeeding-support/art-20043871
[https://perma.cc/985H-K4VC] (recommending fathers attend classes to learn
“the positions and techniques involved,” so “you might be better able to help
your partner”; to “understand the impact that the use of bottles, pacifiers and
supplemental feedings can have on the breast-feeding process”; and to “spur you
and your partner to make decisions together . . . .”).
154. Regardless of whether the lactating and non-lactating parents are romantic partners, they are breastfeeding partners.
155. See Prenatal Classes: Supporting the Breastfeeding Parent, THE
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Parents can also invest in social capital related to breastfeeding, regardless of sex. Through the course of breastfeeding,
parents develop relationships with professionals who support
breastfeeding, such as the obstetrician, midwife, doula, pediatrician, and lactation consultant.156 Parents also find it useful to
develop relationships with others who are going through the experience of breastfeeding.157 Even when it comes to relationships
that are thought to be primarily with the lactating person—such
as the obstetrician, midwife, or lactation consultant—any parent
can play a role in forming, maintaining, and deepening these relationships.158 Finding the right relationships is especially important because not all doctors or hospitals are equally supportive of breastfeeding.159
In addition to investing in breastfeeding capital, any parent
can engage in breastfeeding labor, regardless of sex. Partners
can perform various forms of breastfeeding labor that do not turn
on the capacity to lactate. Partners can identify and resolve
breastfeeding problems.160 Partners can connect lactating parents to persons who can help, such as lactation consultants.161

BREASTFEEDING CTR. FOR GREATER WASH., https://app.acuityscheduling.com/
schedule.php?appointmentType=12923202&owner=18081780 [https://perma
.cc/6BXS-K4DW] (“This class is intended for fathers, partners, co-parents and
others who are supporting the breastfeeding parent.”).
156. See Amy Brown & Ruth Davies, Fathers’ Experiences of Supporting
Breastfeeding: Challenges for Breastfeeding Promotion and Education, 10 MATERNAL & CHILD NUTRITION 510, 510–11 (2014) (collecting research); LA LECHE
LEAGUE, supra note 144, at 25–26.
157. See CALL TO ACTION, supra note 34, at 20 (collecting studies finding
that peer support improves breastfeeding practices).
158. See LA LECHE LEAGUE, supra note 144, at 31–32 (suggesting that a key
role fathers play is connecting mothers to needed support persons); Amy Bassett, Open Letter to Breastfeeding Dads, LACTATION CONSULTANTS OF CENT.
FLA., https://lactationconsultantsofcentralfl.com/breastfeeding-tips/open-letter
-to-breastfeeding-dads [https://perma.cc/Q84Q-5YNJ] (indicating that “the majority of people who contact [her lactation consultant office] are fathers”).
159. See Jennifer Bernstein & Lainie Rutkow, Hospital Breastfeeding Laws
in the U.S.: Paternalism or Empowerment?, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 163, 174–75
(2015) (explaining certification for hospitals and birthing centers that have
adopted best practices for promoting breastfeeding).
160. See Sherriff et al., supra note 137, at 675 (recounting one mother’s experience of the emotionally supportive role a partner can play: “[I]f you’re freaking out about the baby . . . they’re there” and can suggest “let’s just Google that
it might just be something really simple.”).
161. See supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text.
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Partners can attend appointments with these professionals162 to
serve as advocates163 and consistent sources of advice.164
Partners can feed babies expressed milk.165 This is needed
not only when the lactating parent is away from the baby, but
also when babies cannot latch to the breast,166 when lactating
162. See Erin Stieglitz, Lactation Consultant: Should I Bring My Husband
to My Lactation Consultations?, LEADING LADY (May 2, 2018), https://www
.leadinglady.com/blogs/archive/lactation-consultant-should-i-bring-my
-husband-to-my-lactation-consultations [https://perma.cc/Q6ZG-XN2M] (noting
that, during these appointments, “the lactation consultant may give [fathers]
tasks to help with feedings”).
163. See Sherriff et al., supra note 137, at 675.
164. See id. at 671 (noting substantial “inconsistency of information and advice given to parents from health professionals regarding breast feeding,” and
that “[f ]athers may therefore have an important part to play in ensuring continuity of advice”).
165. Once breastfeeding is established, on average at four weeks, breastmilk
can be expressed and fed to the baby. See Introducing a Bottle to a Breastfed
Baby, LA LECHE LEAGUE INT’L (Aug. 2018), https://www.llli.org/breastfeeding
-info/introducing-a-bottle-to-a-breastfed-baby [https://perma.cc/RZ57-V3YB].]
Research is just beginning on the question of whether and to what extent the
benefits of breastfeeding are from nursing directly at the breast or also from
consuming expressed breastmilk. See Meghan B. Azad, Lorena Vehling, Deborah Chan, Annika Klopp, Nathan C. Nickel, Jonathan M. McGavock, Allan B.
Becker, Piushkumar J. Mandhane, Stuart E. Turvey, Theo J. Moraes, Mark S.
Taylor, Diana L. Lefebvre, Malcolm R. Sears, Padmaja Subbarao & CHILD
Study Investigators, Infant Feeding and Weight Gain: Separating Breast Milk
from Breastfeeding and Formula from Food, 142 PEDIATRICS 1092, 1092 (2018)
(finding that nursing was superior to consuming expressed breastmilk in reducing obesity).
Partner support with expressed breastmilk becomes even more essential
when a baby has difficulty breastfeeding. See Linda Sweet & Philip Darbyshire,
Fathers and Breast Feeding Very-Low-Birthweight Preterm Babies, 25 MIDWIFERY 540, 543–50 (2009) (documenting this with interviews). Consider this
scenario described by a father of a premature baby: “Sara would nurse Elliott
as long as she could. . . . When she was done, she’d continue pumping as much
as she could. Meanwhile . . . holding Elliott, I’d slowly feed him [with a tube
connected to a breastmilk-filled syringe] by putting the tubed finger in his
mouth—giving him something to suck on—while pressing down on the syringe. . . . Someone would clean up the pumping supplies and the syringe to be
ready for the next feeding, while the other would change him. . . . We were supposed to feed him upward of 12 times a day. So about 45 minutes out of every
two hours was taken up with nothing but the feeding process.” Andy Shaw, The
Truth About Breastfeeding that New Dads Need to Know, INSTAFATHER (Mar.
22, 2015), https://www.instafather.com/dad-blog/2015/3/21/my-new-dad-story
-why-breastfeeding-was-the-hardest-the-best-newborn-experience
[https://perma.cc/E6TK-R22K].
166. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 365.
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parents do not feel comfortable breastfeeding in public,167 and
when gay couples rely on donor breastmilk.168 Any parent can do
the labor adjacent to expressing breastmilk, like cleaning the
pump and bottles, storing extra milk, preparing frozen breastmilk for use, and transporting a pump or parts.169 And when the
lactating parent and baby are apart—during the workday, for
example—the partner can transport the baby to the lactating
parent to be breastfed,170 a strategy that may be necessary when
the lactating parent cannot effectively express breastmilk, or
when the baby refuses a bottle.171
Sometimes non-lactating partners are uniquely situated to
contribute to breastfeeding in ways that lactating persons cannot. Because they are not breastfeeding the baby, non-lactating
partners are better positioned, literally, to see how the baby is
positioned and adjust the positioning accordingly.172 Having the
partner burp the baby and hold the baby during the course of

167. See CALL TO ACTION, supra note 34, at 13 (collecting studies documenting this phenomenon).
168. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 365. Partners can feed
their infant expressed breastmilk with a supplemental nursing system, which
mimics breastfeeding by allowing for skin-to-skin contact and for the baby to
learn or retain the skill of suckling. See Supplemental Nursing System
(SNS), MEDELA, https://www.medela.com/breastfeeding-professionals/products/
feeding/supplemental-nursing-system [https://perma.cc/EBK5-DHXY] (describing a reservoir filled with expressed breastmilk or formula that is placed on the
chest with tubes fixed alongside the nipples that release milk as the baby feeds,
and explaining that it “[t]rains the baby to suck properly by creating a vacuum
at the breast”); Inducing Lactation: Men Can Breastfeed Too!, COLO. SURROGACY (July 30, 2019), https://www.coloradosurro.com/blog/inducing-lactation
-men-can-breastfeed [https://perma.cc/9GBL-5NDE] (explaining that a supplemental nursing system “is a way men and women can ‘breastfeed’ without producing milk” and that “[i]t’s a great bonding tool”).
169. See The Fatherly Guide, supra note 29; Hunt, supra note 135.
170. See, e.g., Dike v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 650 F.2d 783, 785 (5th Cir.
1981) (recounting how a father regularly brought the baby to the mother’s workplace to be breastfed).
171. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 379–81 (discussing pumping problems).
172. See Lucas Godinez, Fathers, Breastfeeding& Bonding, INT’L LACTATION
CONSULTANT ASS’N BLOG (Aug. 17, 2013), https://lactationmatters.org/
category/fathers-2 [https://perma.cc/E3L2-6985] (advising that fathers “can
make sure the infant is latching appropriately” and “can help position the
baby”); 8 Ways, supra note 148 (quoting lactation consultant stating that she
“just changed [her] workshops to include dads more” because “dads can see”
better “the overall mom and baby position”).
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feeding brings particular benefits, including allowing the baby
to eat more173 and learn important hunger cues.174
Non-lactating partners can also perform breastfeeding labor
by supporting the lactating parent. Partners can physically support the lactating parent with massages,175 or by preparing food
or drinks for them.176 Because of the biological features of lactation, feeding the lactating parent is a component of feeding the
breastfed child.177 Partners can also provide emotional support
to the lactating parent by giving encouragement or simply by being present during breastfeeding,178 especially in public.179 As

173. See Diane Erdmann, The Role of Dad in Breastfeeding, BREASTFEEDING
SUPPORT & SUPPLIES OF OMAHA, https://web.archive.org/web/20200921085600/
https://omahabreastfeeding.com/newsletter-archive/the-role-of-dad-in
-breastfeeding [https://perma.cc/FQ4T-GFQK] (explaining advantage of
“hav[ing] dad burp the baby in between breasts,” because “[b]abies get very
warm and snuggly next to mom’s warm breasts and fall asleep easily” before
they are done eating, so “[i]f dad takes baby after eating” the baby is more likely
to stay awake and “[y]ou might get a burp out and be ready to nurse some
more”).
174. See id. (explaining that “[b]oth parents need to share the role of holding
baby as often times when babies are fussing and mom is holding them, they
think, ‘Hey, mom is holding me and I can smell food nearby so I guess I should
be eating while I’m here[,]’” whereas “[i]f dad holds baby after eating, [babies]
should realize they don’t need more, they are just ready for someone else to hold
and cuddle them”).
175. See Hunt, supra note 135 (recounting how his “wife didn’t want to move
once the baby had latched,” so she “often . . . found herself in a rather uncomfortable position,” and he would give her a massage, which allowed him to
“feel like [he] was a part of the whole feeding process”).
176. See Godinez, supra note 172; see also Wallwork, supra note 30.
177. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 479 (stating that
“[e]nergy requirements for lactation are approximately 500 kcal per day over
the recommended caloric intake”). More broadly, because the breastfed child is
dependent on the biological production of the lactating parent, any labor that
supports the lactating parent’s milk production also supports the breastfed
child, rendering all such labor a form of breastfeeding care work. See Dorothy
E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 54–
55 (1997) (discussing the Marxist concept of production, which includes “the reproduction of the tools and labor power required for production”).
178. See Sherriff et al., supra note 137, at 675.
179. See id. at 674 (quoting one father reporting: “If we have to stop somewhere to breastfeed, I’ll find somewhere . . . help cover her up, make sure she
has water”). Partners can also serve as visual shields. See The Fatherly Guide,
supra note 29 (“Subtly use your body to block gawkers if she is breastfeeding in
public.”). Partners can also be advocates if anyone complains about public
breastfeeding. See Sherriff et al., supra note 137, at 675.
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one site aimed at encouraging father involvement in breastfeeding recognized: “For moms who have been shamed while breastfeeding in public, and unfortunately there are many, the support
of a partner or bystander can make all the difference in giving
her the courage to continue feeding her baby whenever and
wherever baby is hungry.”180
Although cisgender men can perform breastfeeding care
work,181 some transgender men and nonbinary persons can lactate.182 In many states, a lactating transgender man is deemed
legally male, at least by some markers.183 When transgender
men directly feed babies with their human milk, it is often referred to as “chestfeeding.”184 Some transgender men can lactate
even if they have had their breasts surgically removed.185

180. Beth Leyba, If I Could, I Would: Men Offer Breastfeeding Support, THE
GOOD MEN PROJECT (Mar. 12, 2014), https://goodmenproject.com/featured
-content/kt-men-offer-breastfeeding-support [https://perma.cc/62V8-7F3D].
181. This may soon change. See Cederstrom, supra note 28 (discussing peerreviewed case report confirming that a transgender woman assigned male at
birth was able to breastfeed for six weeks following a hormone regimen);
Mathilde Cohen, The Lactating Man, in MAKING MILK. THE PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE OF OUR PRIMARY FOOD 141, 141–43 (Mathilde Cohen & Yoriko Otomo
eds., 2017) (describing how cisgender men have been known to lactate with sufficient mechanical or hormonal stimulation).
182. See MacDonald et al., supra note 23, at 106 (“Transmasculine individuals also lactate and chestfeed babies they have birthed.”). The academic literature on chestfeeding is growing. See, e.g., Trevor Kirczenow MacDonald, Lactation Care for Transgender and Non-Binary Patients: Empowering Clients and
Avoiding Aversives, 35 J. HUM. LACTATION 223 (2019); Joan E. Dodgson, NonConforming: Aren’t We All in One Way or Another?, 35 J. HUM. LACTATION 212
(2019); Robyn Lee, Queering Lactation: Contributions of Queer Theory to Lactation Support for LGBTQIA2S+ Individuals and Families, 35 J. HUM. LACTATION 233, 235–36 (2019). And chestfeeding is no longer arcane. See Britni de la
Cretaz, What It’s Like to Chestfeed, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www
.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/08/chestfeeding/497015 [https://perma.cc/
L3FX-3K58].
183. See Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/article/
trans-changing-birth-certificate-sex-designations
[https://perma.cc/QZY9P3DW] (last updated Sept. 17, 2018); Clarke, supra note 42, at 896–97 (discussing legal status of nonbinary identity).
184. See MacDonald et al., supra note 23, at 107 (“‘[C]hestfeeding’ is used to
refer to transmasculine or gender non-conforming individuals and the act of
feeding a baby or child at the chest . . . .”).
185. Id. (criticizing sex-differentiated parental leave policies not grounded
in biological differences).
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2. Breastfeeding as Biology in Law
The presence of breastfeeding care work has escaped notice
because sex equality law has either ignored breastfeeding altogether, or viewed it as a biological event only.186 If breastfeeding
is solely a matter of lactation, then there is no breastfeeding care
work to be unsexed.
There are no precedents explicitly addressing the constitutionality of a sex classification regulating breastfeeding. Yet the
Supreme Court has ignored breastfeeding even when it is relevant, and thus has missed the opportunity to identify breastfeeding care work that must be unsexed. For example, the Court’s
2003 decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs addressed the constitutionality of state parental leave policies that afforded women more leave than men.187 As for the
“period of physical disability due to pregnancy and childbirth,”
the Court acknowledged that there is a real physical difference
between men and women, but that any post-birth leave afforded
on the basis of sex must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that
it is “attributable to . . . differential physical needs of men and
women.”188
So when it came to one physical difference following childbirth that might be relevant to sex-differentiated leave policies—
physical recovery from childbirth—the Court discussed in detail
how this biological sex difference should be treated for purposes
of unsexing.189 But when it came to another physical difference
following childbirth that might be relevant to sex-differentiated
leave policies—breastfeeding—the Court was silent as to how
this biological sex difference should be treated for purposes of
unsexing. The Court thus missed an opportunity to explain that
sexed breastfeeding regulations must also be carefully scrutinized to ensure that they are not premised in the “pervasive sexrole stereotype that caring for family members is women’s

186. For more on the judicial tendency to view reproductive biology solely in
terms of its physiological facts rather than its social features, see Fontana &
Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 330–31; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 267–77 (1992).
187. 538 U.S. 721, 724–25 (2003).
188. Id. at 731.
189. See id.
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work.”190 So rather than explaining how men can perform breastfeeding care work, the Court said nothing about breastfeeding at
all.
Breastfeeding has been raised more squarely in the lower
courts. In Knussman v. Maryland, the Fourth Circuit confronted
the permissibility of sex discrimination based on breastfeeding,
but there too the court remained silent on men’s role in breastfeeding.191 That case involved an equal protection challenge
raised by a male employee of the State of Maryland who claimed
that the State’s leave policy that afforded more leave to “primary
care givers” than “secondary care givers” was applied on the basis of sex.192 When the employee contacted his employer about
whether he would qualify as the primary caregiver for his newborn child, he was told, in a comment prefiguring Tucker Carlson’s reaction to Pete Buttigieg,193 that “fathers would only be
permitted to take leave as secondary care givers since they
‘couldn’t breast feed a baby.’”194
The court held the sex discriminatory application of the policy to be unconstitutional because it amounted to “dissimilar
treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated.”195
In stating that mothers and fathers are “similarly situated” despite the employer’s reliance on a way in which they are not—
the capacity for breastfeeding—the Fourth Circuit reached the
right result with the wrong reasoning. Rather than explaining
how the physical difference of lactation alone would not justify a
sex-based rule regarding leave to care for an infant, the Fourth
Circuit, like the Court in Hibbs, ignored breastfeeding. And like
the Court in Hibbs, it missed the chance to explain how, despite
the physical sex difference of lactation, sex-based breastfeeding
rules may be premised in impermissible stereotypes, because
mothers and fathers are “similarly situated” when it comes to
performing breastfeeding care work.
Because courts have ignored breastfeeding as a matter of
constitutional sex equality jurisprudence, they have ignored the
190. Id.
191. 272 F.3d 625, 638 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing the unconstitutionality of
“child-nurturing leave benefits available [only] to the primary care giver,” but
failing to mention breastfeeding).
192. Id. at 629 (recounting the plaintiff ’s allegation that “only birth mothers
could qualify as primary care givers” under the State’s policy).
193. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
194. Knussman, 272 F.3d at 629.
195. Id. at 635 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)).
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breastfeeding care work that any parent can perform, regardless
of sex. Without any guidance from constitutional law about how
breastfeeding can and should be unsexed, when courts address
breastfeeding in other areas—most notably in the context of statutory sex discrimination law—they view breastfeeding as the
physical fact of lactation only, and thus as a phenomenon
“unique to women.”196
Courts evaluating claims of sex discrimination in employment based on breastfeeding have considered whether a breastfeeding woman has any similarly situated male comparators.197
Courts have answered in the negative.198 They have treated the
notion that breastfeeding would impact men at work as “impossible,”199 reasoning that an employer’s adverse action motivated
by breastfeeding “clearly imposes upon women a burden that
male employees need not—indeed, could not—suffer.”200 Remarkably, one court proclaimed breastfeeding to entail only “a

196. Martinez v. NBC, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (explaining that “breast feeding . . . is unique to women”); accord Derungs v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 884, 890, 894 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (assuming that
“breast-feeding . . . is unique to women”); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F.
Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990), aff’d 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991) (accepting
that “breast-feeding, like pregnancy, is a uniquely female attribute”); U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2015-1, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES, at I.A.4.b (2015),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-pregnancy
-discrimination-and-related-issues#_ftnref55
[https://perma.cc/5CGV-8SBQ]
(“[B]ecause only women lactate, a practice that singles out lactation or breastfeeding for less favorable treatment affects only women . . . .”).
197. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J.
728, 750 (2011) (documenting how courts view comparators as the “defining element” of a discrimination claim).
198. Courts have agreed on this conclusion but have reached different results about whether this means that breastfeeding discrimination amounts to
sex discrimination. Compare, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Hous.
Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that, because
lactation affects only women, discriminating on this basis is discriminating on
the basis of sex), with Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 884,
891 (2000) (concluding that, because lactation affects only women, and thus
there can be no male comparators, that discriminating on this basis is not discriminating on the basis of sex).
199. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (discussing “[t]he drawing of distinctions among persons of one gender [women] on the basis of criteria that are
immaterial to the other [men]”).
200. Hous. Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d at 428; accord Martinez, 49 F. Supp.
2d at 310 (same).
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communion between mother and child” in a case where the father performed substantial breastfeeding care work by regularly
transporting his child to be breastfed at the mother’s workplace.201 On this view, courts have held that there is no reason
that “male workers” would have any “child-care concerns” that
would require accommodation of the sort that “breast-feeding female workers” have.202 In so doing, courts overlook the breastfeeding “child-care concerns,” like attending a breastfeeding
class, visiting a lactation consultant, or transporting a baby to
be breastfed, that men and women workers alike can share.
Scholars too have failed to account for breastfeeding care
work that is not dictated by sex. Early scholarship mapping out
the evolving jurisprudence on unsexing had to confront how the
doctrine should address pregnancy and breastfeeding, the two
aspects of parenting that involve physical sex differences. When
it came to pregnancy, scholars often took the case head-on, urging the law to rely on male comparators with other physical disabilities to form the basis for sex discrimination claims.203 Yet
these same scholars downplayed breastfeeding,204 suggesting
that breastfeeding could not support sex-based regulations because of all the other parenting work unrelated to breastfeeding
that men can do.205 In so doing, they viewed breastfeeding as
simply a matter of lactation, and almost entirely overlooked

201. Dike v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 650 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1981).
202. Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869–70 (W.D. Ky. 1990),
aff’d, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991).
203. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the
Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
325, 327–28 (1984–85) (explaining how nonpregnant but similarly disabled men
can serve as comparators for sex discrimination claims based in pregnancy).
204. See id. at 360 n.135 (responding, in a footnote, to another scholar who
“would add breastfeeding to pregnancy as a difference between the sexes which
must be fully taken into account”: “I confess ambivalence on that point.”).
205. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955, 1033 (1984) (deeming a law that would provide parental leave only to
breastfeeding women unconstitutional because “[e]ither parent, or a stranger,
is biologically capable of caring for a child”).
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breastfeeding care work that can be unsexed.206 With one important exception not focused on law,207 contemporary legal
scholarship continues to overlook how men can be involved in
breastfeeding.208
B. HOW WE SEX BREASTFEEDING
Despite the existence of breastfeeding care work that can be
performed regardless of sex, the law of breastfeeding excludes
men from its benefits and protections. The law treats breastfeeding as a physical experience based in the biological sex difference
of lactation, leaving the legal realm of breastfeeding almost exclusively to women. While not exhaustive, this Part surveys the
most significant areas of sexed breastfeeding law. It first discusses how each of these areas of law are sexed in the context of
the traditional heterosexual family, as that is the family structure that animated the law of sex equality.209 It then highlights
how these areas of law are sexed by excluding transgender, nonbinary, gay, and lesbian parents.

206. At best, these scholars recognized that men could feed infants expressed
breastmilk. See Williams, supra note 203, at 360 n.135 (“Bottled milk, human
or not, need not be fed to the infant by the mother.”). Even when social features
of breastfeeding were recognized, they were limited to women. See Siegel, supra
note 186, at 375 n.448 (treating “breast-feeding” as a “fundamentally social”
practice, but still one that affects only women because “[w]omen are alone physiologically capable of engaging in the work [of breastfeeding]”).
207. Mathilde Cohen’s work traces the ways that men can be involved in
breastfeeding, and this Article owes a debt to the groundwork laid therein. See
Cohen, supra note 181, at 157–58 (explaining that “[m]en do not need to literally
lactate . . . to participate in breastfeeding,” as “[m]en (just like everyone else
regardless of sex and gender) can support breastfeeders,” and listing “a variety
of [such] behaviors”). Cohen’s project is sociological rather than legal: she addresses how breastfeeding can be unsexed, but not the role the law plays in
sexing or unsexing breastfeeding.
208. Cf. Darren Rosenblum Noa Ben-Asher, Mary Anne Case, Elizabeth
Emens, Berta E. Hernández-Truyol, Vivian M. Gutierrez, Lisa C. Ikemoto, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, Kimberly Mutcherson, Peter
Siegelman & Beth Jones, Pregnant Man?: A Conversation, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 277 (2010) (attributing to Professor Elizabeth Emens the recognition
that a gay couple feeding their baby donor breastmilk is “kind of ” breastfeeding).
209. See supra notes 79–93 and accompanying text.
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1. Health Law
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) generally requires health plans to offer benefits to mothers and fathers equally,210 but not when it comes to breastfeeding. While
the specific required benefits were to be determined later by an
expert panel,211 the ACA included a mandate for covered employers to offer insurance plans that provided certain benefits without cost sharing, but only “to women.”212 The resulting regulations included “comprehensive lactation support services,” such
as the provision of “breastfeeding equipment and supplies” (e.g.,
breast pumps) and breastfeeding “counseling” and “education”
(e.g., lactation consultant appointments and breastfeeding classes),213 but only “with respect to women.”214
The ACA did not mandate comparable coverage for fathers,
even when such coverage could benefit them. This means that a
father is not guaranteed insurance coverage for “education” like
a breastfeeding class,215 despite the critical role such human capital plays in determining whether the father is involved in performing key forms of care for a breastfed baby.216 Nor is the father guaranteed insurance coverage for “counseling” from a
210. See Danielle Garrett, Marcia Greenberger, Judy Waxman, Anna Benyo,
Kate Dickerson, Katherine Gallagher-Robbins, Rachel Moore & Sarah Trumble,
Turning to Fairness: Insurance Discrimination Against Women Today and
the Affordable Care Act, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (2012), https://nwlc.org/wp
-content/uploads/2015/08/nwlc_2012_turningtofairness_report.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/NXF7-R2MF] (noting the ACA’s prohibition on sex discrimination in
insurance company-provided health plans).
211. Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines-2019 [https://perma.cc/43VB
-Z6XS] (last updated Jan. 2022) (requiring that additional care for women be
“provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [the Health Resources
and Services Administration]”).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (requiring insurance coverage, “with respect
to women,” for “such additional preventive care and screenings not . . . provided
for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration”).
213. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 211 (“The Women’s Preventive Services Initiative recommends comprehensive lactation support services
(including counseling, education, and breastfeeding equipment and supplies)
during the antenatal, perinatal, and the postpartum period to ensure the successful initiation and maintenance of breastfeeding.”).
214. § 300gg-13(a)(4).
215. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 211.
216. See, e.g., 8 Ways, supra note 148 (demonstrating the roles that non-lactating partners can play in breastfeeding).
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lactation consultant,217 even though such social capital can be
crucial to a father learning how to feed his infant a bottle of
breastmilk.218 And if a mother is uninsured, a father cannot use
his health insurance to cover the cost of “breastfeeding equipment,” like a breastpump, to benefit his child.219 Several states
sex breastfeeding support further by requiring that medical personnel provide breastfeeding education and counseling, but
again, only to women.220
Other federal laws, like the Child Nutrition Act, require the
provision of “breastfeeding promotion and support activities”
and “the distribution of breastfeeding equipment” to promote
breastfeeding among low-income populations.221 But they do so
only for “women,”222 and thus deny to men benefits like breastfeeding education and counseling that can be used by fathers in
parenting their children. By contrast, efforts to unsex care work,
generally by providing other “nutrition education” to all “parents,” are present in this very same law.223

217. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 211.
218. See Videotape Interview with Isabela Lessa, Int’l Bd. Certified Lactation Consultant, Breastfeeding Ctr. for Greater Wash. (2020) [hereinafter Lessa
Interview] (notes on file with author) (indicating that fathers make appointments without the mother if they are learning how to bottle feed, as do gay men
using donor breastmilk).
219. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 211.
220. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/3.4(a)(16) (2022) (granting “every
woman . . . [t]he right to receive information about breastfeeding”); MO. REV.
STAT. § 191.915 (2022) (requiring hospitals to provide “information on breastfeeding; and . . . information on local breast-feeding support groups; or . . .
breast-feeding consultations” but only to “mothers”). For a list of sexed state
healthcare laws regulating breastfeeding, see infra App. B.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1790(a) (“The Secretary . . . shall establish a breastfeeding
promotion program to promote breastfeeding as the best method of infant nutrition, foster wider public acceptance of breastfeeding in the United States, and
assist in the distribution of breastfeeding equipment to breastfeeding women.”);
7 C.F.R. § 246.11(c)(7)(iv) (2014) (requiring “[a] plan to ensure that women have
access to breastfeeding promotion and support activities during the prenatal
and postpartum periods”). Not all federal law misses the role of fathers in
breastfeeding. See 45 C.F.R. § 1302.81(a) (2016) (requiring that Headstart program “provide enrolled pregnant women, fathers, and partners or other relevant
family members the prenatal and postpartum information, education and services that address, as appropriate . . . the benefits of breastfeeding”).
222. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 211.
223. See 7 C.F.R. § 246.11(c)(4) (2021) (requiring that “nutrition education
[be] offered . . . to parents and guardians”).
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The law regulating healthcare-related tax deductions likewise sexes breastfeeding. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (also called the Medicare
Modernization Act) created the modern version of medical flexible spending accounts (FSAs).224 FSAs allow many employees to
set aside pretax wages in a separate account created by their
employer to pay for eligible healthcare expenses.225 What
healthcare expenses qualify for this special treatment is a matter of federal law.226 Federal law generally permits mothers and
fathers to use FSAs on equal terms for parenting expenses.227
When it comes to the physical fact of lactation, FSAs do well in
covering the expenses related to breastfeeding, such as nursing
bras.228 But when it comes to expenses related to breastfeeding
care work that can be done by either parent, like attending a
breastfeeding class, they are covered for the mother only,229
again excluding fathers from learning the skills needed to make
them effective parents.
2. Workplace Law
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as amended by the
ACA, and many state laws require employers to provide eligible
employees with reasonable break time to express breastmilk.230
224. See Alyssa A. DiRusso, Charity at Work: Proposing a Charitable Flexible Spending Account, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 281, 307–14 (2014).
225. See id. at 309.
226. For various terms, see I.R.C. §§ 67(b)(5), 68(c)(1), 213(a); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.213-1(a), (e)(1) (2021).
227. See DiRusso, supra note 224, at 312–13 (noting the Code’s provision of
dependent-care assistance, which provides care benefits to children).
228. See, e.g., Which Expenses Are Eligible for HSA, FSA, and HRA
Reimbursement?, CIGNA [hereinafter Which Expenses], http://www.cigna.com/
qualified-health-care-expenses [https://perma.cc/6SXM-667M] (“Breastfeeding—Pump, Shields, Gel Pads, Nursing Bras, and lactation supplies are reimbursable.”).
229. What Are My FSA Eligible Expenses?, WAGE WORKS, https://www
.wageworks.com/takecare-mynewfsa/healthcare-fsa-carryover-overview/
eligible-expenses [https://perma.cc/HR24-3ER6] (indicating that “childbirth
classes (charges for mother only)” are covered); Which Expenses, supra note 228
(indicating that “[e]xpenses for childbirth classes” including the subject of “nursing” are covered, “but are limited to expenses incurred by the mother-to-be,”
specifically indicating that “[e]xpenses incurred by a ‘coach’ – even if that is the
father-to-be are not reimbursable”).
230. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (“An employer shall provide—(A) a reasonable
break time for an employee to express breast milk for her nursing child for 1
year after the child’s birth each time such employee has need to express the
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By accommodating lactation but not related breastfeeding care
work that can be performed by any parent, the statute ignores
the ways that fathers can be involved in breastfeeding even during the workday, albeit far less often than mothers. Fathers
could be granted reasonable break time to transport a
breastpump or parts when they have been forgotten or have broken, or to transport expressed milk directly to the baby if there
is no extra milk supply, or to another location if the milk storage
conditions at the workplace are inadequate. These forms of
breastfeeding care work may seem trivial, but they can make a
real difference when time is of the essence231 and when mothers
are already spending substantial amounts of time expressing
milk.232
Several states allow employees to use break time not only
for expressing milk, but also for nursing babies at the breast,233
which public health officials have touted as “the most effective
strategy” for making breastfeeding compatible with employment.234 In these jurisdictions, fathers could be more involved by
regularly transporting the baby to and from the mother’s workplace.235 But no “reasonable break time” is afforded for this purpose.236 So even when the law tries to accommodate breastfeeding more substantially, it falls short by focusing on lactation and
failing to recognize the accompanying breastfeeding care work
that can performed by any parent, regardless of sex.

milk . . . .”). For a list of state workplace breastfeeding accommodation laws, see
App. C.
231. Expressing breastmilk is time sensitive; skipping or delaying an expression can lead to breast engorgement for the mother and insufficient milk for the
child. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 256–60.
232. See Wendelin Slusser, Linda Lange, Victoria Dickson, Catherine
Hawkes & Rona Cohen, Breast Milk Expression in the Workplace: A Look at
Frequency and Time, 20 J. HUM. LACTATION 164, 167 (2004) (finding that
breastfeeding workers express milk on average twice per day, with more frequent expression for younger infants).
233. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40w(a) (2022) (granting right to “express breast milk or breastfeed” at the workplace during break); see also 23 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-13.2-1(a) (2022) (providing break time “to breastfeed or express
breast milk” if it does not impose an “undue hardship” on the employer); infra
App. C.
234. See CALL TO ACTION, supra note 34, at 52.
235. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
236. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (requiring “a reasonable break time for an employee
to express breast milk”).
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The FMLA also sexes breastfeeding in the workplace. The
FMLA grants a mother workplace leave to visit a doctor, midwife, or lactation consultant to address sufficiently serious
breastfeeding-related medical problems, such as a clogged milk
duct, mastitis, or breast abscess.237 Because such problems may
require different feeding techniques, such as different positioning of the baby or feeding the baby expressed breastmilk, such
an appointment may include advice and education about breastfeeding the child.238 Yet the law only grants the father leave to
attend such appointments under limited circumstances. The father may take leave only if he is “needed to care for [the
mother].”239 By conditioning the father’s right to leave on the
mother’s rather than the child’s needs, the law fails to recognize
the father as a parent who can provide valuable breastfeedingrelated care to the child. Still further, the FMLA limits this benefit to fathers who are the “spouse” of the breastfeeding
mother.240 When the father of the child is not married to the
mother—as in upwards of forty percent of births241—he is not
entitled to leave. The FMLA thus fails to acknowledge the unmarried father as an important part of breastfeeding in his own
right, regardless of his relationship with the mother or the
mother’s need.
Fathers can even be terminated from employment for performing breastfeeding care work. The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA) amending Title VII to protect against employment
discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy” and “related medical
conditions”242 has sometimes been held to protect against discrimination on the basis of breastfeeding,243 but by its own terms
237. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (providing leave “[b]ecause of a serious
health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of
the position of such employee”); see also WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140,
at 283–306 (discussing serious breastfeeding-related medical problems).
238. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 283–306.
239. 29 C.F.R. § 825.120(a)(5) (2021) (“A spouse is entitled to FMLA leave
. . . if needed to care for her following the birth of a child if she has a serious
health condition.”).
240. Id.
241. See Unmarried Childbearing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-childbearing.htm [https://
perma.cc/KC7B-UEQY].
242. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
243. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunities Comm’n v. Hous. Funding II, Ltd.,
717 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that “lactation is a related medical
condition of pregnancy for purposes of the PDA”); see also Deborah A. Widiss,
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covers only “women.”244 This assumes that only women face adverse consequences at work due to breastfeeding, and excludes
fathers from protection.245 A woman who leaves work to attend
a lactation appointment is within the PDA’s protection.246 A man
who leaves work to attend the same appointment and is fired for
being seen as more committed to family than work has no cause
of action,247 even though such a termination is premised on the
very type of sex stereotype that Title VII was meant to eradicate.248

The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act After Young v. UPS, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1423, 1448 (2017)
(noting “a growing recognition in the courts that discrimination related to
breastfeeding or lactation violates the PDA”).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’
include . . . because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work . . . .”).
245. See supra Part II.A.1 and accompanying text (discussing breastfeeding
care work that non-lactating partners might need to perform during the workday). Over half the states require employers to provide reasonable accommodations to pregnant workers for “pregnancy or related medical conditions.” E.g.,
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12945(a)(3)–(4) (West 2022); see State Pregnant Workers
Fairness Laws, A BETTER BALANCE (Nov. 29, 2021), https://www.abetterbalance
.org/resources/pregnant-worker-fairness-legislative-successes
[https://perma
.cc/MQ3E-82UB]. While these laws tend to be written in gender-neutral terms,
they still sex breastfeeding. Because these laws provide accommodations, not
for the social practice of breastfeeding, but for the physical fact of “lactation,”
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710, 711(b)(3), 716 (West 2022), or “the need to
express breast milk,” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1E) (2018), they are unlikely to extend to the type of breastfeeding care work that men perform.
246. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (“[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . .”).
247. See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 431 F.3d 325, 331–32 (8th Cir. 2005)
(addressing these protections as applied to men under the PDA); Equal Emp.
Opportunities Comm’n. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 85 C 5637, 1985 WL
352, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1985) (same).
248. If an employer allowed women but not men to attend lactation consultant appointments, a man would have a claim for sex discrimination under Title
VII. But the right that the PDA grants—to be treated the same as other nonbreastfeeding but similarly situated employees—would not protect him. So, if a
father, but not a mother, who leaves work to transport a breastpump is fired,
he may bring a claim for sex discrimination. But if a father and mother are both
fired for transporting the breastpump, and another employee who leaves work
for a comparable non-breastfeeding reason is not, the mother would have a
claim of discrimination under the PDA, but the father would not.
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3. Public Accommodations
Federal law249 and the law of all fifty states250 protect the
right to breastfeed in public.251 But these laws grant this right
only to mothers who are breastfeeding and not to fathers simultaneously performing associated breastfeeding care work.252
This means that a mother who is breastfeeding cannot be kicked
out of a place she otherwise has a right to be, but a father who is
there to support her can be.253 The exclusion of fathers from
these laws not only fails to protect fathers’ role in breastfeeding,
but also fails to protect breastfeeding women themselves. Given
the anxiety and shaming that some women experience when
breastfeeding in public, the right to do so might not mean much
without a right to support as well.254
249. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629,
118 Stat. 3, 357 (2004) (“[A] woman may breastfeed her child at any location in
a Federal building or on Federal property, if the woman and her child are otherwise authorized to be present at the location.”).
250. See Breastfeeding State Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Aug. 26, 2021) [hereinafter Breastfeeding State Laws], https://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/breastfeeding-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/S4N4-EH3S].
251. For a compelling argument that this right should be extended to expressing breastmilk, see generally Mathilde Cohen, The Right to Express Milk,
33 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47 (2021).
252. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-302 (2022) (“A mother may breastfeed in any place she has a right to be.”); infra App. E. Some states also prohibit
the denial of public services on the basis of breastfeeding, but only “to a woman
because she is breastfeeding a child.” See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.232(a)
(2022). One state bars harassment for public breastfeeding, but only for “a
mother who is breastfeeding her child.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 221(c)
(2022). One state also protects the right to bottle feed in public, but only for
mothers. See 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-13.5-1 (2021) (“A woman may feed her child
by bottle or breast in any place open to the public.”). Sexing this type of care
unrelated to any biological sex difference easily violates equal protection. See
supra Part I.B.
253. See, e.g., CALL TO ACTION, supra note 34, at 13 (citing studies finding
that “[w]hen they have breastfed in public places, many mothers have been
asked to stop breastfeeding or to leave”); Breastfeeding Mother Kicked out of
Florida Restaurant, FOX NEWS (June 28, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/
food-drink/breastfeeding-mother-kicked-out-of-florida-restaurant
[https://
perma.cc/Z55N-N2ZT] (emphasis added) (reporting on a couple kicked out of a
restaurant because the mother was breastfeeding, stating, “[t]he couple . . . took
to social media to express how they felt about the way they were treated,” and
relaying couple’s post that, “we had never had a word said to us about breastfeeding until today”).
254. See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
partner support in public breastfeeding, including by alleviating anxiety, acting
as a visual shield, and serving as an advocate).
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Other federal and state laws require certain locations to include a private space to breastfeed or express breastmilk.255 The
Friendly Airports for Mothers Act, for example, requires airports
to “provide[] a location for members of the public to express
breast milk.”256 The law sexes breastfeeding by dividing persons
into two types: those who “express breast milk,” who may use the
space, and all others, who “intru[ded]” on those expressing
breast milk, and must be excluded.257 The terms of the statute
exclude fathers who might support breastfeeding from these
spaces. Laws like this one sex breastfeeding by assuming that
breastfeeding entails only the matter of lactation, while ignoring
and inhibiting the valuable forms of breastfeeding care work
that parents of either sex can perform.
Fathers’ exclusion from such spaces means that they are denied the ability, not only to support the breastfeeding mother,
but also to perform the types of infant care, like changing a diaper, that arise during the course of breastfeeding—precisely the
type of care that the Court has long recognized must be unsexed.258 Notably, the sexed approach to breastfeeding here contrasts starkly to affirmative efforts to unsex infant care through
the thoughtful design of infrastructure in this very same law.
The Act requires infant changing tables in men’s restrooms to
encourage men to be involved in all forms of infant care.259 Yet
this law denies fathers access to breastfeeding spaces, resulting
in their exclusion from these very same forms of care.
4. Civil Rights Law
Many states consider breastfeeding as a factor in the duty
to serve on a jury, but they all do so on the basis of sex. Almost
255. See infra Apps. A, F.
256. 49 U.S.C. § 47107(w)(3)(A)(i); see also Fairness for Breastfeeding Mothers Act of 2019, 40 U.S.C. § 3318(b) (requiring a covered public building “contain[ ] a lactation room that is made available for use by members of the public
to express breast milk”).
257. 49 U.S.C. § 47107(w)(3)(A)(i) (requiring “a location for members of the
public to express breast milk that is shielded from view and free from intrusion
from the public”).
258. See supra Part I.A.
259. 49 U.S.C. § 47107(w)(1)(B) (requiring “a baby changing table in at least
one men’s and at least one women’s restroom in each passenger terminal building of the airport”). See generally Holning Lau, Shaping Expectations About
Dads as Caregivers: Toward an Ecological Approach, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183,
185, 189, 205–08 (2016) (discussing the importance of infrastructure like changing tables in men’s bathrooms in shaping men’s role in caregiving).
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twenty states provide automatic exemptions to jury service to
“mother[s]” “who are breastfeeding.”260 A number of these states
provide blanket exemptions for breastfeeding but no exemptions
for childcare.261 In these states, the breastfeeding mother gets
an exemption from jury service, but a father never will, regardless of his role in supporting breastfeeding. Other states that
provide an automatic exemption for breastfeeding women sometimes provide exemptions for childcare, but these exemptions are
so limited that fathers performing breastfeeding care work will
rarely be eligible.262
The fungibility of childcare as compared with the nonfungibility of lactation might seem to justify the distinct treatment of
breastfeeding.263 But compare the mother who only nurses her
child at bedtime264 to the father of a premature baby performing
breastfeeding labor around the clock.265 She does not need an accommodation for breastfeeding to perform jury service, and he
very well may. Yet in some states, she is granted an automatic
exemption from jury service, and he is not eligible for one at all.
Once these facts are recognized, it is apparent that laws regulating jury service and breastfeeding on the basis of sex rely on and
reinforce stereotypes about the proper roles of women and men
260. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 30, 2000, ch. 266, § 1, 2000 Cal. Stat. 2441, 2441
(providing that “the mother of a breast-fed child [can] postpone jury duty for a
period of one year[,]” or longer by request); IOWA CODE § 607A.5 (2022) (allowing
“[a woman to] be excused from jury service if . . . [she] is the mother of a breastfed child”); infra App. G.
261. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 260.
262. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 494.430 (2022) (providing automatic exemption for “nursing mother,” but to care for a child only to avoid “extreme . . . hardship”); 38 OKLA. STAT. § 28 (2022) (providing automatic exemption to a “mother
who is breast-feeding a baby,” but to care for a child only to avoid “undue or
extreme physical or financial hardship”).
263. See Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81, 93 (1997) (defining “[f ]ungible things” as those
that “can be replaced by something else that falls in the same place on the metric, such as similar services by a different person” and discussing whether family work qualifies). Breastfeeding has been and sometimes continues to be fungible, at least to some extent. See Roberts, supra note 177, at 56 (discussing
slaves serving as wet nurses); see also Mathilde Cohen, Should Human Milk Be
Regulated?, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 557 (2019) (discussing markets for breastmilk).
264. See Kelly Bonyata, Becky Flora & Paula Yount, Weaning Techniques,
KELLY
MOM,
https://kellymom.com/ages/weaning/wean-how/weaning
-techniques [https://perma.cc/HZ7Y-DDHE] (explaining that as part of the
weaning process “[i]t is very normal for a baby to drop all but one feeding”).
265. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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in caring for young children, just as laws limiting women’s role
on juries have long done.266
5. Hortatory Policies
Almost twenty states have hortatory policies promoting
breastfeeding enshrined in their law.267 All of these laws are
sexed.268 Some of these laws use language that might be concerning from the perspective of the law’s mandate to unsex parenting. For example, it is “the public policy of Kansas that a
mother’s choice to breastfeed should be supported and encouraged to the greatest extent possible” because “[b]reast milk is
widely acknowledged . . . to improve maternal . . . bonding.”269
This language itself might raise a red flag for what it expresses
that is in tension with the mandate to unsex parenting: that
bonding between infants and mothers is more important than
bonding between infants and fathers, and that men are irrelevant to parenting when it comes to a key aspect of the care of
many infants: breastfeeding.270
Further, these hortatory provisions are concerning for how
they could be applied in cases where the mother’s bonding with
the child through breastfeeding is in tension with the father’s
266. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58–62 (1961) (allowing a state
law that made women’s jury service voluntary over an equal protection challenge because women’s place was at “the center of home and family life”); Brief
for Petitioner, Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (No. 77-6067), 1977 WL
189874, at *8 (arguing against a law exempting women from jury duty upon
their request). Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who represented the Duren petitioner, explained explains that “states justified women’s exemptions by assuming that
most women would be too busy with home and children to serve on juries, and
that it would be more convenient to exempt all women than to determine which
are actually unable to serve.” Id.
267. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1,248(a) (2022); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 201.232 (2017). For a list of sexed state hortatory breastfeeding laws, see infra
App. H.
268. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
269. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1,248(a) (2019); accord, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 201.232(1)(h), (d) (2017) (exhorting “acceptance of this most basic act of nurture between a mother and her baby” to “improv[e] bonding between mothers
and their babies”); see also infra App. H.
270. See Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, Behavioral Assumptions of Policy
Tools, 52 J. POLS. 510, 519–21 (1990) (explaining how hortatory laws can affect
behavior); see also Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women’s
Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 765, 785–86 (2002) (suggesting, in the context of sex
discrimination, that “mere government pronouncements of principle unmoored
from direct, binding connection to policy” can still bring “serious constitutional
problems” by the messages they express).

2022]

UNSEXING BREASTFEEDING

183

bonding with the child. Consider, for example, a disputed custody case where the mother claims that breastfeeding entitles
her to more physical custody than she would otherwise be allotted.271 Two states expressly include breastfeeding among the factors courts may consider in determining custody,272 and in other
states, breastfeeding would presumably be a factor in such determinations.273 Breastfeeding mothers could rely on these hortatory policies to argue for custody that might be in tension with
the dictates of equal protection.274
Consider the Pennsylvania case of Stephon v. Malmad,275
where the court addressed a custody dispute that turned on the
mother’s right to breastfeed—one of the few cases to do so and to
consider sex equality concerns.276 There, the mother sought to
limit the father’s custody and visitation to “segments of four
hours under conditions and circumstances which would allow
her to breast-feed.”277 The father did not object to breastfeeding,
but sought “extensive unsupervised contact” with his infant
daughter.278 The court acknowledged that sex equality law abrogated the tender years doctrine, which treated mothers as the
presumptive custodians of young children,279 and that “a child of
tender years or months needs to bond with a father as well as
271. Most states favor joint physical custody. See J. Herbie DiFonzo, From
the Rule of One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law and Policy,
52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 216 (2014).
272. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27a(7)(b) (West 2022) (noting that a
court “may consider . . . [w]hether the child is a nursing child less than 6 months
of age, or less than 1 year of age if the child receives substantial nutrition
through nursing”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-34(3)(o) (West 2022) (noting that a
court “may consider . . . the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a
nursing child”).
273. Custody determinations are generally grounded in the best interests of
the child, considering all of the relevant circumstances. See DiFonzo, supra note
271, at 216–17.
274. See, e.g., State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. 1973)
(holding that any presumptive preference in favor of maternal custody violated
the father’s right to equal protection).
275. 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 510 (C.P. Ct. 1996).
276. See id.; see also In re Marriage of Norton, 640 P.2d 254, 254–55 (Colo.
App. 1982) (rejecting a father’s sex equality challenge to a custody denial due to
breastfeeding).
277. Stephon, 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 512. Presumably, this meant that the
visits would occur at the mother’s home, and the mother “would intercede instantly if the infant began to cry or sought her mother’s attention.” Id. at 513.
278. Id. at 512.
279. Id. at 519.
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with its mother.”280 The court ruled for the father because “no
. . . authority” supported the idea that the mother’s interest in
breastfeeding trumped the father’s interest in his relationship
with the child as an exception to sex discrimination law.281
But this framing of the issue—the mother’s right to breastfeed versus the father’s right to custody—downplays how unsexing breastfeeding can allow courts to move past a zero-sum approach. In this case, and in many others, breastfeeding and
father custody are not at odds, because of the breastfeeding care
work that fathers can perform.282 Yet when it comes to a father’s
role in breastfeeding, courts in these cases have remained silent,
at best noting that the mother can express breastmilk283 but failing to recognize the ways that a father can support breastfeeding
by feeding his child expressed breastmilk, transporting his child
to the mother for feedings, transporting expressed breastmilk to
his child, or visiting his child with the mother present to allow
and support breastfeeding. Once fathers’ role in breastfeeding
care work is acknowledged, breastfeeding can be made compatible with paternal custody in many circumstances.284

280. Id. at 518 (“Indeed, our whole jurisprudential philosophy of shared legal
and physical custody emanates from a belief in the benefit to the child from
frequent contact from both parents.”).
281. Id. at 519 (“Our request for legal authority from counsel that unlimited
breast-feeding to the exclusion of father’s reasonable visitation was permitted
as an exception to the Equal Rights Amendment produced no such authority,
nor are we aware of, nor have we heard of any such authority.”); cf. Dike v. Sch.
Bd. of Orange Cnty., 650 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing a liberty
interest in breastfeeding, but one “subject to some limitation . . . where other
interests become dominant”).
282. Stephon, 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 517 (noting that “there was no tangible
evidence that appellant would not be able to continue with breast-feeding due
to the modes and periods of time we allowed for father’s partial custody”).
283. See H.O. v. G.T., No. CN08-04254, 2010 WL 1199810, at *6 (Del. Fam.
Ct. Jan. 13, 2010) (“Mother has the ability to express her milk if she deems that
nutritionally important for [the child].”); Beebe ex rel. N.E. v. Elmenhorst, No.
103,658, 2010 WL 3488832, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2010) (noting that the
mother “admitted it was possible for her to pump breast milk”).
284. Recognizing breastfeeding care work that can be performed regardless
of sex reduces the tension between a mother’s desire to breastfeed and a father’s
time with a child, but does not eliminate it. Some circumstances render a father’s involvement in breastfeeding more difficult, for example, when the parents live a great distance apart, when the mother cannot express breastmilk, or
when the child cannot be fed with expressed milk. See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, No.
2007-CA-001368-MR, 2008 WL 2152277 (Ky. Ct. App. May 23, 2008) (denying
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Note, however, that Stephon v. Malmad granted the father
visitation because there was no legal authority to support the
position “that unlimited breast-feeding to the exclusion of father’s reasonable visitation was permitted as an exception to the
Equal Rights Amendment.”285 Other courts faced with the same
question in the presence of a state law exhorting that “a mother’s
choice to breastfeed should be supported and encouraged to the
greatest extent possible”286 might reach a different conclusion,
especially as men’s role in breastfeeding care work continues to
go largely unseen.287
6. Excluding LGBTQ Parents
The discussion above has focused on how the law sexes
breastfeeding by remaining blind to breastfeeding care work
that any parent can perform, regardless of sex. These laws may
problematically exclude not only cisgender men in opposite-sex
couples, but also cisgender men in same-sex couples, who may
benefit from some of these supports, for example, breastfeeding
education.288 And when these laws limit their reach to those who
are lactating, as some do,289 these laws also exclude mothers in

father visitation to a breastfed child who lived in another state); cases cited supra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing the mother’s ability to express
milk). There is no single solution to these cases. Courts must consider the best
interests of the child, but should do so while attending to the constitutional concerns of unsexing parenting, acknowledging the role that fathers can play in
breastfeeding.
285. Stephon, 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 518.
286. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1,248(a) (2022).
287. One court has rejected this argument. Over a breastfeeding mother’s
objection that a parenting plan was inconsistent with the state policy to promote
breastfeeding, the court explained that the father “did not receive extended visitation with [the child] until [the] breast feeding was tapering off,” and was not
“given an entire weekend of parenting time” until an age “at which time she
presumably did not need to nurse nearly as frequently.” Beebe, 2010 WL
3488832, at *2. However, the mother raised this argument late, and the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in light of this.
Id. If this argument had been raised earlier, the outcome might well have been
different. And even without the benefit of this argument, the trial court still
seriously restricted the father’s time with the child until “breast feeding was
tapering off,” notwithstanding the fact that the mother was able “to pump
breastmilk.” Id.
288. See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503f(a)(1)(R) (West 2022) (requiring insurers to cover “[b]reastfeeding support and counseling for any pregnant or breastfeeding woman”).
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same-sex couples who are not breastfeeding but who can perform
breastfeeding care work.
The sexed law of breastfeeding also excludes transgender fathers and nonbinary parents from its protections, and in a still
broader way. These parents can, like all parents, perform breastfeeding care work. But they may also lactate.290 This means that
each and every breastfeeding law, including ones that relate only
to lactation, could apply equally to transgender fathers and nonbinary parents. Yet under laws that regulate breastfeeding on
the basis of sex, people who lactate but do not identify as women
are put to a cruel choice of denying their identity or being denied
critical breastfeeding protections and benefits.
A few examples illustrate this. Take laws that criminalize
public indecency. Many states exempt breastfeeding from these
laws,291 but only for women.292 While cisgender men would not
need these protections, transgender men and nonbinary persons
who breastfeed or chestfeed may, but they are nonetheless excluded.293 Or, consider workplace accommodation laws. While
cisgender fathers do not need “reasonable break time . . . to express breast milk,”294 transgender fathers and nonbinary parents may. Yet a law that limits this accommodation to women
denies them this protection.295 This Article later discusses how
excluding LGBTQ parents from breastfeeding reinforces the
type of sex stereotypes that equal protection has long sought to
undo. Here the point is that the sexed law of breastfeeding excludes lactating parents who are situated precisely as lactating
mothers are, only on the basis of sex.
290. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text.
291. See Breastfeeding State Laws, supra note 250 (citing thirty-one states).
292. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1402(B) (2022) (“Indecent exposure
does not include an act of breast-feeding by a mother.”); infra App. D.
293. In many states, transgender persons can change their legal sex without
any anatomical or hormonal changes, so that a person with breasts could be
legally male. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
294. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r).
295. The text of the federal provision refers to “an employee,” but a number
of factors suggest an application to women only. First, this provision uses the
female pronoun. See id. (“her nursing child”). Because the remainder of the
FLSA uses the term “employee” in conjunction with the male pronoun “his” to
refer to employees in a sex-neutral way, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 213, the use of “her”
indicates a sex-specific meaning. Second, the title of the relevant provision—
“[r]easonable break time for nursing mothers”—refers only to women. 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(r). Some analogous state laws are clearly sexed. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 305(a) (2021) (“For an employee who is a nursing mother, the employer
shall . . . [p]rovide reasonable time . . . to express breast milk.”).
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III. SEXING PARENTING BY SEXING BREASTFEEDING
The unsexed law of parenting and the sexed law of breastfeeding represent a deep divide in the law of sex equality. While
some aspects of breastfeeding turn on lactation, other aspects of
breastfeeding turn on care work that can be separated from sex.
This Part argues that breastfeeding care work is comparable to
other forms of care work and thus should be treated consistently.
It starts by explaining how the two circumstances are comparable because they both shape a common core concern of sex-equality law: the distribution of family work and market work. Breastfeeding and its associated care work are part of the foundational
period after birth that shapes investments that parents make at
home and in the market, as well as employers’ expectations of
these investments. The failure to unsex breastfeeding thus undercuts the law’s efforts to unsex parenting. This Part then addresses two concerns unique to the caregiving context of breastfeeding—autonomy and privacy—and explains why these
concerns do not undermine the comparison between breastfeeding care work and other forms of care work. Finally, this Part
explains how the sexed law of breastfeeding violates the law’s
dictate to unsex parenting, not only by its impact on cisgender
heterosexual couples, but on other parents and parenting configurations.
A. BREASTFEEDING AS PARENTING
Sexed breastfeeding law is comparable to sexed parenting
law in terms of its harmful consequences for sex equality. The
period immediately after a child is born operates at the “faultline
between work and family.”296 Laws regulating infant care—including laws regulating breastfeeding—that presume that the
“mother is the center of home and family life”297 start in motion
“a . . . cycle of discrimination that force[s] women to continue to
assume the role of primary family caregiver, and foster[s] employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work
and their value as employees.”298
Before going further, it must be emphasized that the comparison between the law of breastfeeding and the law of parenting is not perfect. The law need not treat “the allocation of family
296. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003).
297. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
298. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
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duties”299 exactly the same for men and women when these duties entail a physical sex difference.300 The physical fact of lactation may thus be relevant to determining whether sex-based
laws regulating breastfeeding are justified.301 And many aspects
of breastfeeding turn on lactation. Only the lactating person can
nurse the baby or express breastmilk. Only they have to risk exposing their breasts when feeding in public. Only they have to
endure the pain, discomfort, and medical complications that
breastfeeding sometimes brings.302 Only their health conditions303 and what they consume304 will affect the milk they produce and their ability to breastfeed.
Nonetheless, biological sex does not render these areas of
law fully distinct. The aim of sex-equality law is to eradicate “the
pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is
women’s work.”305 The sexed law of breastfeeding encourages
women to invest in caregiving and discourages men from doing
so. The sexed law of breastfeeding also leads employers to stereotype women as committed to care and men as committed to career. In Hibbs, the Supreme Court recognized the crucial role of
the period immediately after birth for developing caregiving
identities and attachments.306 Excepting breastfeeding from the
law’s efforts to unsex parenting in this critical period not only
runs headlong with sex equality in law but also with its achievement in life.
299. Id. at 730.
300. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (indicating that
“[p]hysical differences between men and women” can justify sex-based classifications); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731 (suggesting that the “differential physical needs
of men and women” can legitimate different treatment).
301. This Article argues that given that some transgender men and non-binary persons lactate, even breastfeeding laws related only to lactation should
not regulate on the basis of sex. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that breastfeeding
laws which draw distinctions on the basis of sex or lactation do not withstand
heightened scrutiny).
302. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 281–313 (cataloging pain
and medical problems associated with breastfeeding).
303. See id. at 159–75, 481–548 (discussing how maternal health affects
breastfeeding).
304. See id. at 127–58, 471–80 (discussing how maternal drug therapy and
nutrition affect breastfeeding).
305. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731.
306. See id. at 736 (“These mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a selffulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the
role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views
about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.”).
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The period immediately following the birth of a child is so
critical because of the role it plays in generating (or not generating) attachments between parent and child that are enduring.
Performing infant care, including breastfeeding care work, generates attachment between parent and child, in two ways. It does
so directly, as the act of providing care bonds caregiver to child
and child to caregiver.307 It also does so indirectly, by changing
the parent’s self-concept.308 The more that a new parent embraces their new identity, the more attached to and involved
with the infant that parent will be.309 Early patterns of attachment are sticky and predictive of later patterns of care.310
Engaging in breastfeeding care work is especially important
for fathers precisely because they generally do not lactate. Fathers, then, typically do not enjoy the attachment or change in
self-concept that breastfeeding brings to lactating parents.311 It
is all the more crucial that fathers be involved with breastfeeding care work so they too can develop their parental identities
and attachments with their breastfed children.
To play this out,312 the father of a breastfed infant may assume that his crying baby is hungry and that only the mother
307. See Tiffany Field, Attachment and Separation in Young Children, 47
ANN. REV. PSYCH. 541 (1996) (reviewing attachment theory literature); Jennifer
Abbass-Dick, Tran Huu Bich, Lynn Rempel, John Rempel, & Duncan Fisher,
Breastfeeding as Family Teamwork: A Research to Practice Briefing (International), FAM. INCLUDED (Aug. 31, 2018), https://familyincluded.com/
breastfeeding-family-teamwork [https://perma.cc/XU2X-44V29AGH-T8KQ] (reviewing research on breastfeeding and attachment).
308. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE 131–42 (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1980) (setting forth the theory that a new parent’s self-concept
changes from a recipient to a provider of care); Maria P. Fracasso, The Concurrent Paths of Parental Identity and Child Development, in IDENTITY FLEXIBILITY DURING ADULTHOOD 151, 151 (Jan D. Sinnott ed., 2017) (explaining that
parental identity develops through the process of parenting).
309. See ELLEN GALINSKY, THE SIX STAGES OF PARENTHOOD 74–79 (1987)
(discussing relationship between parent-infant attachment and parental identity change).
310. Hormonal changes brought on by providing infant care generate neurobiological changes in the father, affecting care of his children for the rest of his
life. See Ilanit Gordon, Orna Zagoory-Sharon, James F. Leckman & Ruth Feldman, Oxytocin and the Development of Parenting in Humans, 68 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 377, 377 (2010). Generally, fathers who attach early to children are
more attentive to their care later on. See Abbass-Dick et al., supra note 307.
311. See, e.g., Sherriff et al., supra note 137, at 674 (reporting that fathers
sometimes felt “left out” of breastfeeding and “concerned over a perceived lack
of bonding opportunity with the infant”).
312. I am indebted to Clare Huntington for playing it out this way for me.
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can provide the needed comfort, a circumstance that can make
many men feel inadequate.313 This can establish a dynamic that
has a profound and lasting impact on gendered caregiving.
Breastfeeding dictates much of the time and schedule of an infant.314 If men are not involved in this process, they will be uninvolved not only with a major aspect of the infant’s life, but with
a huge part of their days and nights. The breastfeeding mother
becomes the primary parent by default. And if women take
charge of feeding from the start without partner involvement,
they are far more likely to take charge of key moments of feeding
as the child grows, such as transitioning the child to solid food.315
This puts different-sex couples down the path to a gendered division of labor that, once set in motion, is difficult to disrupt.316
Sexing breastfeeding also makes it far more likely that
childcare adjacent to breastfeeding will likewise be sexed. This
is because breastfeeding turns not only on the physiology and
behavior of the mother, but on the physiology and behavior of
the baby.317 If a lactation consultant diagnoses an issue with the
baby that makes breastfeeding difficult, this might require visits
to the pediatrician or surgery.318 Although this is clearly care for
the baby, if the father is not present at the lactation consultant
appointment, the mother will likely be the one to do the childcare
stemming from this as well. So, while a law like the FMLA unsexes parenting by granting fathers leave to take care of a child
with a “serious health condition,”319 the sexed law of breastfeeding makes it less likely that he will do so.

313. See Sherriff et al., supra note 137, at 674 (reporting such feelings of
helplessness but also a desire for involvement with adequate knowledge).
314. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 248 (noting that newborns nurse frequently and “virtually every time they wake up, day and night,
for many months”).
315. See Abbass-Dick et al., supra note 307.
316. See id.; Hanna Rosin, The Case Against Breast-Feeding, ATLANTIC (Apr.
2009), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/04/the-case-against
-breast-feeding/307311 [https://perma.cc/PA8R-VXZT] (explaining that breastfeeding can leave women “feeling trapped” in domestic roles).
317. WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 215 (“Breastfeeding is dependent not only on the mother, but also on the behaviors of the newborn.”); id.
at 249 (recognizing the host of infant-based factors that affect breastfeeding,
such as illness, injury, and physical anomalies).
318. Id. at 255 (discussing medical treatment for tongue-tie, a condition that
makes it difficult to breastfeed).
319. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
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Cases like Hibbs identify the importance of unsexing care
work, yet the sexed law of breastfeeding seriously undermines
these efforts to unsex parenting. The sexed law of breastfeeding
affects men’s and women’s caregiving behavior by changing the
costs of this behavior through the provision of benefits and protections. Laws reduce the cost of breastfeeding education and
support to mothers, but not fathers.320 Laws protect mothers but
not fathers from risking their job for tending to breastfeeding
matters.321 Laws protect mothers who breastfeed in public but
not partners who provide them with support.322 Many states
have enshrined as their policy the goal of promoting breastfeeding to support maternal-infant bonding while ignoring how
breastfeeding could support paternal-infant bonding as well.323
Women tend to have the experiences and expectations to be
primary caregivers,324 so sexed laws encouraging women to do
breastfeeding care work only compound these tendencies. Men
do not have these same experiences and expectations,325 and
thus they need more support to spur greater involvement in
caregiving.326 Men want to be involved in breastfeeding, but they
often feel helpless.327 It turns out that men who receive help with
the right forms of support are far more likely to be involved in

320. See supra Part II.B.1.
321. See supra Part II.B.2.
322. See supra Part II.B.3.
323. See supra Part II.B.5.
324. See, e.g., Alyssa Croft, Toni Schmader & Katharina Block, An Underexamined Inequality: Cultural and Psychological Barriers to Men’s Engagement
with Communal Roles, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 343, 344 (2015)
(citing research that women make up the overwhelming majority of front-line
workers in many caring professions).
325. See Sherriff et al., supra note 137, at 674 (discussing research finding
that men are less knowledgeable about breastfeeding than women).
326. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. V. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 n.2 (2003)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5)) (explaining that the FMLA provided parental
leave to fathers to change the reality that “the primary responsibility for family
caretaking often falls on women”).
327. See, e.g., Brown & Davies, supra note 156, at 511 (citing research that
fathers want to support their partner with breastfeeding but they feel left out
and helpless to support their partner); Sherriff et al., supra note 137, at 674
(reporting that fathers want to know the best ways to help their breastfeeding
partners, but they feel helpless).
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breastfeeding than those who do not.328 But instead of encouraging men’s participation in breastfeeding with these types of support, the sexed law of breastfeeding does the opposite, denying a
host of resources to men that it affords to women.
In addition to its impact on the relative cost of breastfeeding
for men and women, the sexed law of breastfeeding can also affect behavior by the messages it sends.329 Fathers get the message—loud and clear—that they are not proper participants in
the breastfeeding process.330 Mothers get this message, too,
which is equally important, as mothers’ beliefs about fathers’ appropriate role is a key predictor of fathers’ involvement with
their children.331 Employers receive harmful messages, too.
Laws such as the FLSA, which mandate workplace breastfeeding accommodations to women but not men, make women on average more expensive to employ than men—exactly the opposite
of sex-equality law’s goal.332 Other sexed laws contribute to the
belief that breastfeeding care work—for example, attending
breastfeeding classes and visiting lactation consultants—is the

328. See Pisacane et al., supra note 137, at 494 (finding that teaching fathers
how to prevent and manage the most common lactation difficulties substantially increased the rate at which fathers provided breastfeeding support).
329. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996) (arguing that law’s expressive function is in
changing norms in a way that can ultimately change behavior).
330. See Brown & Davies, supra note 156, at 510 (finding that men reported
being excluded from prenatal breastfeeding education and being marginalized
in postnatal breastfeeding support); Rempel & Rempel, supra note 137, at 115
(finding that fathers’ perceptions of their role in breastfeeding is important to
their influence on mothers’ breastfeeding decisions and experiences).
331. See Brent A. McBride, Geoffrey L. Brown, Kelly K. Bost, Nana Shin,
Brian Vaughn & Byran Korth, Paternal Identity, Maternal Gatekeeping, and
Father Involvement, 54 FAM. RELS. 360, 360 (2005) (discussing this finding as
part of the phenomenon of “maternal gatekeeping,” essentially mothers’ control
over fathers’ care work); Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 177, 206 (2000) (citing research finding that “[w]omen are often reluctant to trust their husbands with the responsibility of providing adequate
care”).
332. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223,
232 (2000) (observing that workplace accommodations that go to identifiable
groups increase the cost of employing those groups); 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6) (stating that the gender-neutral FMLA was meant to avoid the “serious potential for
encouraging employers to discriminate against [women] employees and applicants” generated by women-only leave policies).
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responsibility of the mother alone, and thus perpetuate the stereotype that women will invest more at home and less at work
than their male colleagues.333
On the flip side, employers believe that breastfeeding has
no impact on fathers’ work. Fathers enjoy a wage boost upon the
birth of a child—the so-called “fatherhood premium.”334 Indeed,
employers may prefer fathers as compared to childless men because they presume that fathers will intensify their breadwinning efforts335—but only if fathers conform to this expected sex
role. If the father performs too much care work, he is likely to
face a “flexibility stigma.”336 Fathers cite employer backlash as
one reason they are discouraged from doing more care work.337
The sexed law of breastfeeding plays a key role in this. The father who seeks an accommodation granted to mothers (e.g., leave
to accompany the mother to an appointment for a breastfeeding
problem) is asking for something excessive under current law.338
These mechanisms of sex inequality have a real economic
impact. While breastmilk itself may be free, breastfeeding is far
333. Consider a Texas statute that allows employers who provide certain
breastfeeding accommodations to be designated “mother-friendly.” TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.003 (West 2021). This law and its associated website ensure that, in the minds of employers, breastfeeding is solely a
mother’s burden. See Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., Mother-Friendly
Worksite, TEX. MOTHER-FRIENDLY (2012), http://texasmotherfriendly.org
[https://perma.cc/E6TP-82AV].
334. See Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the “Family Gap” in Pay for Women
with Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 137, 143 (1998) (explaining that while mothers earn less than childless women, “[t]here is no such family penalty for men,”
and “married men, most of whom have children, earn more than other men”);
Shelly Lundberg & Elaina Rose, Parenthood and the Earnings of Married Men
and Women, 7 LAB. ECON. 689, 705–06 (2000) (“Fatherhood leads to a 9% increase in wages . . . .”).
335. See Jeffrey D. Gage & Ray Kirk, First-Time Fathers: Perceptions of Preparedness for Fatherhood, 34 CAN. J. NURSING RSCH. 15, 19–21 (2002) (discussing that when women plan to breastfeed, their male partners plan to intensify
their work efforts).
336. Joan C. Williams, Mary Blair-Loy & Jennifer L. Berdahl, Cultural
Schemas, Social Class, and the Flexibility Stigma, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 209, 220–
21 (2013) (discussing employer stigma men face when they are involved in caregiving).
337. See Magnus Bygren & Ann-Zofie Duvander, Parents’ Workplace Situation and Fathers’ Parental Leave Use, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 363, 365 (2006)
(reporting that features of a father’s workplace may affect the length of his parental leave).
338. See infra App. C (cataloging state laws that grant workplace leave for
breastfeeding to women only).
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from costless. The most substantial cost of breastfeeding is its
opportunity cost,339 in terms of the time it takes to nurse a baby
or express breastmilk, and the time it takes to develop breastfeeding capital and perform breastfeeding labor.340 Women investing more in breastfeeding care work than their male partners means they will invest less in market work during this
time.341 In heterosexual couples, the initial hit to the mother’s
wage after a child is born (and the corresponding bump to the
father’s wage)342 means that fathers engaging in care work have
more to lose in wages than mothers. The gender wage gap that
follows the birth of a child is even more pronounced when women
breastfeed, and when they do so for longer periods.343 This creates a self-fulfilling cycle that continues to render mothers the
cheaper caretakers, and thus continues to encourage ever more
gendered divisions of family and market work.344
Unsexing breastfeeding can narrow the gender gap that results from breastfeeding. The mechanism is twofold: reducing
breastfeeding care work for women and increasing breastfeeding
care work for men. Still, it must be acknowledged that the bulk
of the time required to breastfeed comes down to lactation, which

339. There are other substantial costs as well. See Anna Momigliano, Breastfeeding Isn’t Free. This Is How Much It Really Costs, WASH. POST (May 21,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2019/05/28/breast-feeding
-isnt-free-this-is-how-much-it-really-costs [https://perma.cc/9J7C-B7ZL] (estimating these costs, such as a breast pump, nursing bra, and lactation consultant appointment, to total nearly $700).
340. Economists attend to the opportunity cost of lactation, but not the opportunity cost of breastfeeding care work. See Emilia Del Bono & Chiara Daniela Pronzato, Does Breastfeeding Support at Work Help Mothers and Employers
at the Same Time? INST. FOR THE STUDY OF LAB., 3 (2012), https://www.iza.org/
publications/dp/6619/does-breastfeeding-support-at-work-help-mothers-and
-employers-at-the-same-time [https://perma.cc/RRM5-BCWW] (“[B]reastfeeding is an activity which is intensive in maternal time and therefore in direct
competition with other uses of it, including market work.”).
341. See id. (citing a negative relationship between breastfeeding duration
and maternal employment); Phyllis L. F. Rippeyoung & Mary C. Noonan, Is
Breastfeeding Truly Cost Free? Income Consequences of Breastfeeding for
Women, 77 AM. SOCIO. REV. 244, 260 (2012) (finding that long-duration breastfeeding mothers have lower incomes upon returning to work than formula-feeding mothers and short-duration breastfeeding mothers).
342. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
343. Rippeyoung & Noonan, supra note 341, at 260.
344. See Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 1, 21 (2005) (citing studies showing this dynamic).
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largely cannot be unsexed. The more important impact of unsexing breastfeeding is its effect on the gendered distribution of care
work going forward, after breastfeeding.345 To the extent that
unsexing breastfeeding helps to avoid sticky caregiving dynamics that cement mothers as the primary parent for feeding, nurturing, and comforting,346 unsexing breastfeeding can have a big
impact on the gendered division of labor in the home, and in turn
a big impact on relative investments in men’s and women’s market work.
B. BREASTFEEDING AND THE BODY
This Article has focused on showing that many components
of breastfeeding are appropriately considered care work under
the law of unsexing parenting. These components of breastfeeding can be separated from the physical fact of lactation, and thus
can and should be separated from sex. This Section addresses
two features of breastfeeding that arguably render it distinct
from other aspects of parenting because it involves a lactating
person’s body: (1) that a partner’s involvement in breastfeeding
may infringe on bodily autonomy; and (2) that male involvement
in breastfeeding generally may infringe on women’s privacy.
This Part addresses these arguments in turn, explaining why
neither the autonomy nor the privacy concerns render breastfeeding sufficiently distinct from other aspects of parenting for
purposes of unsexing.
1. Autonomy
Breastfeeding can be distinguished from other forms of care
work because of how it sometimes entails the body. Breastfeeding labor that requires lactation necessarily involves the use of
the lactating person’s body. This arguably distinguishes breastfeeding from other forms of parenting because partner involvement in breastfeeding could infringe on the autonomy that lactating persons (mostly women) should be able to exercise over
their bodies.
There are circumstances when partner involvement in
breastfeeding might raise autonomy concerns. In the context of
terminating a pregnancy, the Supreme Court has recognized

345. See supra notes 305–16 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 305–16 and accompanying text.
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that a woman has a right to make decisions without gaining consent from or providing notice to her husband.347 The Court recently overturned its precedents on a woman’s right to terminate
a pregnancy free from unduly burdensome state interference.348
But the change in law on a woman’s rights vis-à-vis the state
does not necessarily change the status of her rights vis-à-vis the
father when it comes to matters of bodily autonomy, especially
those that do not implicate “fetal life.”349 While the Court, in its
prior precedents recognizing women’s bodily autonomy vis-à-vis
their husbands, cited the woman’s right to bodily autonomy visà-vis the state, the ultimate rationale in these cases was a
woman’s greater interest in decisions about her body than her
husband.350 That interest and rationale should stand even if the
right to terminate a pregnancy without undue state interference
has been nullified.351
347. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896–98 (1992)
(invalidating a spousal notification requirement for abortion that gave the husband an “enforceable right to require a wife to advise him before she exercises
her personal choices”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 71 (1976) (invalidating a spousal consent requirement for abortion).
348. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
349. See id. at 2243 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning that
“abortion is fundamentally different” than other recognized liberty rights “because it destroys . . . fetal life”); Dike v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 650 F.2d 783,
787 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing a qualified liberty interest in breastfeeding, but
one “subject to some limitation at some point where other interests become dominant”).
350. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71 (explaining that “when the wife and the
husband disagree on this decision [to terminate a pregnancy], the view of only
one of the two marriage partners can prevail” and that “[i]nasmuch as it is the
woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in
her favor”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 896 (“[I]t is an inescapable biological fact that
state regulation with respect to the child a woman is carrying will have a far
greater impact on the mother’s liberty than on the father’s.”). Note that whereas
prior to birth, the mother’s rights are superior to the father’s because of “the
urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny and
her body” with “a living child . . . the father’s interest in the welfare of the child
and the mother’s interest are equal.” Id. at 895–96. The Court seems not to have
contemplated the circumstance of breastfeeding, which involves both a “living
child” and “[the woman’s] body.” Id.
351. By way of analogy, consider a case rejecting an unwed father’s request
to be present in the delivery room for his child’s birth over the mother’s objection. See Plotnick v. Deluccia, 85 A.3d 1039 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2013).
While the Court relied in part on the mother’s right to bodily autonomy free
from state interference, it need not have. See id. at 1048. Ultimately, the contest
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Despite a mother’s ostensible right to bodily autonomy visà-vis a father when it comes to breastfeeding, the autonomy concerns that arise in the context of breastfeeding are ameliorated
by the same fact that allows for unsexing breastfeeding in the
first place: much breastfeeding care work can be performed without involving the lactating parent’s body at all. Partners can, for
example, acquire a breast pump, attend a breastfeeding class, or
feed a baby expressed breastmilk. When partner involvement in
breastfeeding does not involve the body, autonomy concerns dissipate.352
Autonomy concerns do arise when partner involvement in
breastfeeding implicates the lactating parent’s body. For example, a breastfeeding mother may not want the father present at
a lactation consultant appointment.353 To address this concern,
partner involvement in circumstances that involve the lactating
parent’s body should turn on that person’s consent.354 With such
a limit in place, unsexing breastfeeding does not infringe on autonomy.355
Applying this limit may require drawing some fine lines. Returning to the lactation consultant, the appointment often entails examining the lactating parent and asking about her
health, and examining the baby and asking about the baby’s
health.356 Unsexing breastfeeding means including partners in
was between the mother and father, and the mother’s interest in bodily autonomy prevailed over the father’s interest in his child. See id. (relying on “the
Court’s opinions in the women’s choice context[, which] subordinate the interests of a father to a mother”).
352. Cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 898 (focusing on the problematic aspect of male
“authority” over his pregnant partner and “control over . . . her body”).
353. See Stephon v. Malmad, 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 510 (C.P. Ct. 1996) (pitting
a mother’s desire to breastfeed her child against the father’s desire for custody);
cf. Plotnick, 85 A.3d at 1039 (rejecting father’s petition to be present at child’s
birth over mother’s objection). Tension between bodily autonomy and the partner’s interest in the child can arise when a partner seeks custody of a breastfed
child. Recognizing the breastfeeding care work that the partner can do without
involving the body of the lactating parent alleviates but does not eliminate the
autonomy concern. See supra Part II.B.5.
354. Cf. Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 364 (proposing a need for
the mother’s consent when father involvement in the pregnancy entails the
woman’s body).
355. Such a limit is especially needed in circumstances of abuse. See Casey,
505 U.S. at 893–94 (explaining how the spousal notification requirement would
be a “substantial obstacle” to abortion in abusive marriages).
356. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 215 (“[A] complete newborn assessment is critical to breastfeeding.”).
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the care of the child357 while respecting bodily autonomy. This
Article suggests a dividing line: partners can be excluded to the
extent that breastfeeding entails the lactating parent’s body (for
example, when the lactation consultant is addressing that parent’s circumstances), but partners should be included to the extent that breastfeeding entails childcare (for example, when the
lactation consultant is addressing the child’s circumstances).358
Simply because unsexing breastfeeding might play into a
lactating parent’s decisions about breastfeeding should not be
considered autonomy-reducing. To the extent that unsexing
breastfeeding increases breastfeeding rates by increasing support for breastfeeding, this might be viewed as autonomy-enhancing. As feminist legal theorists have recognized, those with
caregiving responsibilities—disproportionately women—are less
free when they are left alone, and more free when they are supported.359 Rather than necessarily interfering with autonomy,
partner participation in breastfeeding to assist with the care
work that lactating persons typically shoulder alone can be liberating.
2. Privacy
Breastfeeding can also be distinguished from other forms of
care work because it may entail exposure of what are often considered intimate body parts: the breast generally, and the nipple
specifically.360 When it comes to unsexing breastfeeding, a concern might arise that involving men in breastfeeding violates an
357. Id. (indicating that “[p]arent participation during the [newborn] assessment promotes discussion about normal newborn characteristics and any variations” and “is also helpful for obtaining additional questions about history or
other information that may arise during the examination”).
358. This might suggest two appointments, one with the mother and one
with the father, making it all the more important for men to have their own
insurance coverage for this breastfeeding support. See supra notes 210–20 and
accompanying text.
359. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY
OF DEPENDENCY 20–22 (2004) (arguing that the ideal of “autonomy,” which is
unrealistic for many caregivers, stigmatizes mothers who rely on caregiving
support from a partner or the state).
360. See Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129 YALE L. J.
78, 144–45 (2019) (discussing how the lack of public acceptance of breastfeeding
is based in the sex stereotype that breasts are “primarily for sex”). A movement
aimed at undoing the special legal status of the nipple has had mixed results.
Compare Free the Nipple v. City of Fort Collins, 916 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2019)
(affirming grant of preliminary injunction based on equal protection challenge
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interest in bodily privacy. To understand this concern, it is helpful to divide the law’s approach to accommodating breastfeeding
in public places into two categories: the public approach and the
private approach. In the public approach are those laws that
treat breastfeeding as a public act of care work akin to any other
care work done in public, such as feeding or entertaining a child.
The law has done so by removing legal barriers to breastfeeding
in public.361 The privacy concern arises under those laws that
treat breastfeeding as a private act involving intimate bodily exposure by creating spaces exclusively for breastfeeding.362 The
privacy concern would be that allowing men into such spaces
would infringe on the bodily privacy interests of breastfeeding
mothers.363
Any claim to same-sex privacy as a matter of constitutional
mandate is weak.364 That does not mean that the privacy concern—which some women may genuinely experience—is without
remedy. When it comes to breastfeeding, we are in a time of legal
and social transition. Sex-based privacy interests have shown
themselves to be malleable and subject to legal pressures.365 As
the law presses towards greater public acceptance of breastfeeding,366 the idea that breastfeeding is an intimate act will diminish. If the law presses towards unsexing breastfeeding, the idea
to law barring only females from publicly exposing their breasts except for
breastfeeding), with Free the Nipple v. City of Springfield, 923 F.3d 508 (8th
Cir. 2019) (upholding similar law).
361. See supra notes 249–52 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying text.
363. An interest in same-sex bodily privacy has been recognized as an exception to statutory sex discrimination law, but has been the subject of heavy criticism. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1259 (2003) (examining the legal basis of,
for example, preventing female janitors from cleaning men’s bathrooms, or excluding male nurses from delivery rooms).
364. See id. at 1270–71 (discussing and rejecting possible bases for a constitutional right to same-sex bodily privacy, including either “a penumbral right
to same-sex privacy” or a right “drawn . . . from the decisional privacy doctrine”).
Nor would there be any associational right in a shared breastfeeding space free
from male intrusion. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619–20 (1984)
(holding that the right of intimate association did not trump the interest in preventing sex discrimination where relationships are not close and where the
space was otherwise open to all comers).
365. See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REV.
1167, 1192 (2015) (discussing how women’s preference for female gynecologists
shifted over time as a response to their availability brought on by legal changes).
366. See supra Part II.B.3.
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that breastfeeding is for women only will diminish, too. While we
are in social transition, those with privacy concerns can be accommodated with freestanding lactation units that can fit a
breastfeeding parent, her partner, and a child or children, without exposing her to others.367
C. BREASTFEEDING ACROSS FAMILIES
The sexed law of breastfeeding undermines the law’s efforts
to unsex parenting, not only by its effects on heterosexual couples, but also by its effects on gay, lesbian, transgender, and nonbinary parents.368 The sexed law of breastfeeding also has important implications for equality by its effects on families of
color. This Section takes up these issues in turn.
For transgender and nonbinary parents, a law of breastfeeding that makes women its exclusive beneficiaries is infirm because it excludes lactating transgender men, who in many states
can be deemed male,369 and lactating nonbinary persons, who in

367. See About Us, MAMAVA, https://www.mamava.com/our-story [https://
perma.cc/5QVV-G8RV] (working towards a “future where there is a dignified
lactation space anywhere a parent may go”). Units like these have been used to
fulfill legal mandates for separate breastfeeding spaces. See Legal Compliance,
MAMAVA,
https://www.mamava.com/lactaion-laws
[https://perma.cc/V6DP
-X84H]. But these units should be provided in addition to, rather than instead
of, communal breastfeeding spaces. Aside from undermining the press towards
public acceptance of breastfeeding, family-only units separate lactating persons
and their partners from other lactating persons and their partners. While connections in these spaces are fleeting, they can nonetheless provide support. Call
to Action, supra note 34, at 20 (discussing the importance of mother-to-mother
breastfeeding support). To the extent that these types of accommodations are
necessary only during a period of social transition, temporary legislation might
be a useful mechanism for implementing them. See generally Jacob E. Gersen,
Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 247 (2007) (defining and analyzing temporary legislation as “statutes containing clauses limiting the duration
of their own validity”). Requiring communal breastfeeding accommodations
only temporarily would force the legislature to reconsider whether they remain
necessary when the mandate expires. See id. at 248 (explaining that temporary
legislation “specif[ies] windows of opportunity for policymakers to incorporate a
greater quantity and quality of information into legislative judgments” and “facilitate[s] experimentation and adjustment in public policy”).
368. The sexing of breastfeeding law is one of a number of ways that this
area of law excludes LGBTQ families. See Boone, supra note 32, at 1870 (showing how breastfeeding law excludes these families by limiting its protections to
women who lactate for their biological children, thereby excluding women who
donate breastmilk to gay couples).
369. See supra note 182–83 and accompanying text.
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some states can be deemed not female.370 By denying its protections to transgender men and nonbinary persons, the sexed law
of breastfeeding puts such persons in the unfortunate position of
choosing between the valuable benefits that breastfeeding regulations provide or their identity. The exclusion of even lactating
transgender men from breastfeeding benefits and protections
shows just how deeply the law rejects the idea of men as caregivers, even when they are situated in precisely the same circumstance as women.371 The sexed law of breastfeeding also reinforces the use of gendered language with regard to breastfeeding,
which can be harmful to transgender men.372
Sexing breastfeeding harms transgender men not only by
excluding them from legal protections, but by distinguishing
breastfeeding as for women only.373 In one study of lactating
transgender men, several men who initiated chestfeeding reported having to stop as a result of “overwhelming gender dysphoria.”374 A transgender man who nurses a child experiences
gender dysphoria because breastfeeding (and its associated care
work) have been deemed an exclusively female activity. While
the sexed law of breastfeeding is surely not the only reason for
this, it plays a key role in legitimating and maintaining the notion that breastfeeding is for women only.
The sexed law of breastfeeding also excludes gay and lesbian
parents. Obergefell v. Hodges held that it was unconstitutional
to discriminate against same-sex couples when it comes to many
370. See Clarke, supra note 42, at 896–97.
371. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) (noting that equal protection requires “that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike”).
372. See MacDonald et al., supra note 23, at 107 (finding that “participants
expressed the importance of words related to gender,” explaining that “[b]eing
described with words such as she, her, mom, mum, mother, breasts, or breastfeeding could be distressing for a parent who self-identifies differently” and
could “intensify feelings of gender dysphoria”); Dodgson, supra note 182, at 212
(addressing how gendered language conveys messages about whether health
care providers will be affirming to transgender and nonbinary persons).
373. For an example from life, in 2012, La Leche League initially denied a
transgender man a role as a leader of a breastfeeding support group because it
afforded those roles to women only. See Lee, supra note 182, at 236. After some
protest, La Leche League relented and adopted a functional rather than sexbased rule, allowing anyone with nine months of breastfeeding experience to
serve as group leader. See id.
374. MacDonald et al., supra note 23, at 112 (quoting one such participant:
“I was producing a ton of milk,” but “I didn’t have anything ready socially” for
example, “I had no appropriate . . . male clothes for nursing.”).

202

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[107:139

of the most important facets of parenting.375 There, the Supreme
Court required that “aspects of marital status,” like “birth . . .
certificates . . . and child custody, support, and visitation,”
needed to be open equally to different- and same-sex parents.376
This constitutional dictate to treat different- and same-sex parents equally presumably applies to breastfeeding. The focus of
the sexed law of breastfeeding on the lactating mother as the
exclusive holder of benefits and protections violates this rule.
Sexed breastfeeding regulations exclude all gay men because of their sex. Whereas the sexed law of breastfeeding grants
benefits and protections to one parent in heterosexual couples,
it affords these same privileges to no one in male couples. This
is so even though gay men may feed their children donor breastmilk from a surrogate,377 and thus they may benefit from some
of the supports that the sexed law of breastfeeding provides to
women only, such as breastfeeding education (for example, how
to store breastmilk) or counseling (for example, how to bottle
feed).378 Under this law, gay men are treated as substandard
parents, not only because of their sexual orientation, but also because their families lack an appropriate caregiver—a woman.
This law thus rests on and reinforces both the constitutionally
infirm stereotype that caring is women’s work, and the constitutionally infirm second-class status of same-sex families.379

375. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 668 (2015) (noting that same-sex
couples have the same capacity as different-sex couples to “provide loving and
nurturing homes to their children”); see also Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075,
2077–79 (2017) (invalidating a state law treating birth certificates differently
for different-sex as compared with same-sex married couples).
376. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 670; see also Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61
N.E.3d 488, 504 (N.Y. 2016) (Pigott, J., concurring) (“Same-sex couples are now
afforded the same legal rights as heterosexual couples and are no longer barred
from establishing the types of legal parent—child relationships that the law had
previously disallowed.”).
377. See Rosenblum et al., supra note 208, at 276–77 (describing the experience of gay couple who fed their baby donor breastmilk).
378. See Lessa Interview, supra note 218 (describing how gay men may benefit from these breastfeeding supports and relaying example of a gay couple who
wanted to learn from a lactation consultant how to feed their infant breastmilk
with a supplemental nursing system). For more information on supplemental
nursing systems, see Supplemental Nursing System, supra note 168.
379. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013) (highlighting
the importance of recognition for same-sex parents because their families must
“understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with
other families in their community”).
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As for lesbian women, some sexed breastfeeding laws apply
only to “breastfeeding wom[e]n” and not to women more generally,380 thus excluding nonlactating mothers just as they exclude
fathers. Other laws by their terms apply to “women” generally,381 and thus could be read to cover nonlactating women, including lesbian partners of breastfeeding women. To the extent
that breastfeeding protections apply to nonbreastfeeding mothers but not fathers, they treat similarly situated persons differently—a violation of equal protection382—and they do so on the
basis of sex, reinforcing the idea that care is the realm of
women.383
The sexed law of breastfeeding has racial dimensions, too.384
Breastfeeding rates are lower among families of lower socioeconomic status385—disproportionately families of color.386 This
means that families of color need more, rather than fewer, resources to promote breastfeeding. Although federal law aims to
increase breastfeeding rates for low-income families with a vari-

380. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-503f(a)(1)(R) (West 2022) (requiring insurers to provide coverage of “[b]reastfeeding support and counseling
for any pregnant or breastfeeding woman”).
381. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 246.11(c)(7)(iv) (2021) (requiring “that women have
access to breastfeeding promotion and support activities”).
382. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985).
383. Note that women can induce lactation with hormones, even without
having been pregnant. See WAMBACH & SPENCER, supra note 140, at 769–70
(discussing induced lactation). So a child may have two breastfeeding mothers.
See Lance Wahlert & Autumn Fiester, Induced Lactation for the Nongestating
Mother in a Lesbian Couple, 15 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 753 (2013). Equal
treatment for these families would mean providing breastfeeding benefits for
both breastfeeding parents, for example, in a family with two breastfeeding
mothers, two breastpumps instead of one. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
644, 669–70 (2015) (holding that “society [must] pledge to support the [married]
couple,” whether same-sex or different-sex).
384. For more on the racial dimensions of the law regulating breastfeeding,
see, e.g., Andrea Freeman, “First Food” Justice: Racial Disparities in Infant
Feeding as Food Oppression, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3053 (2015).
385. See Summer Sherburne Hawkins, Sarah Dow-Fleisner & Alice Noble,
Breastfeeding and the Affordable Care Act, 62 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1071,
1072–73 (2015).
386. See John Creamer, Poverty Rates for Blacks and Hispanics Reach Historic Lows in 2019, CENSUS (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.census.gov/library/
stories/2020/09/poverty-rates-for-blacks-and-hispanics-reached-historic-lows-in
-2019.html [https://perma.cc/9FB9-NWTS].
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ety of means-tested breastfeeding benefits, it provides these benefits to women only.387 By excluding fathers, these laws undermine their own goal of promoting breastfeeding among the
groups that most need this support.388 And by disproportionately
excluding Black fathers, these laws reinforce the “racialized
trope” of the “Deadbeat Dad,”389 and continue the law’s failure to
support Black fatherhood.390
IV. UNSEXING BREASTFEEDING
This Article has focused on a key mismatch in the law of sex
equality. Courts and commentators have recognized the importance of unsexing parenting when no physical sex difference
justifies a sexed approach. The law of breastfeeding stands as
the near singular exception.391 This is so even though many aspects of breastfeeding care work are not tied to the biological sex
difference of lactation, and thus can and should be unsexed. This
Part considers what a jurisprudence correcting the outlier status
of breastfeeding law would look like, such that the law of breastfeeding and the law of parenting would present a coherent picture within sex equality law.
This Part addresses how sex equality law can extend the
heightened scrutiny that it typically applies to sex-based regulations to the context of breastfeeding. It explains how the jurisprudential moves to unsex breastfeeding are already present in
the equal protection doctrine that applies to sex. In other contexts, courts have applied exacting scrutiny to sex-based regulations that relate to physical sex differences. This Part begins by
explaining how this doctrine can be extended to unsex breastfeeding, and then details how heightened scrutiny would apply
to sexed breastfeeding law across a number of examples. In so
doing, the Article provides a typology that classifies sexed

387. See sources cited supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text.
388. See sources cited supra note 137 (finding that father involvement increases rates of breastfeeding).
389. Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor
Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 233, 238 (2014).
390. See, e.g., Omarr Rambert, The Absent Black Father: Race, the WelfareChild Support System, and the Cyclical Nature of Fatherlessness, 68 UCLA L.
REV. 324, 341–42 (2021) (“[L]egal mechanisms such as the welfare and child
support systems . . . limit the notion of fatherhood, disadvantaging fathers that
are not capable of supporting their children financially. . . .”).
391. Pregnancy is the other exception. See Fontana & Schoenbaum, supra
note 14, at 309.
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breastfeeding regulations by the equal protection treatment they
merit depending on the degree to which the sexed breastfeeding
regulation relates to the physical sex difference of lactation—
fully, partially, or not at all.
A. CONSTRUCTING SCRUTINY
This Article has identified a key outlier in the law of sex
equality. Sexed breastfeeding laws have not been subject to the
same scrutiny applied to sexed parenting regulations. But just
as sex equality law has scrutinized and invalidated sexed parenting laws that are based in “invidious” sex stereotypes in cases
like Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,392 sex equality law could likewise
scrutinize and invalidate sexed breastfeeding regulations that
are based in similar “invidious” sex stereotypes. Such an application to breastfeeding would accomplish the aim of unsexing
parenting: to free women and men from the “very stereotype the
law condemns.”393
Extending scrutiny to the context of breastfeeding would require courts to distinguish between sex classifications that constitutionally regulate on the basis of physical sex differences and
sex classifications that unconstitutionally regulate on the basis
of sex stereotypes. This would require considering whether men
and women are similarly situated for purposes of the law in
question in light of the law’s goals, notwithstanding the physical
difference of the capacity to lactate.394 To survive such scrutiny,
the law’s reliance on sex would have to be “substantially related”
to the physical difference.395 If the sex-based classification goes
beyond what is necessary to account for the physical difference,

392. See 420 U.S. 636, 651–53 (1975) (invalidating a provision of the Social
Security Act allowing widows but not widowers to collect benefits).
393. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
394. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)) (explaining that the Equal
Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike”).
395. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (stating that sex classifications must “serve[ ] important governmental objectives” and “the discriminatory means employed [must be] substantially related to the achievement of those objectives”).
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the classification would be based in an impermissible stereotype.396
This type of scrutiny can be applied to unsex laws even in
areas like breastfeeding that relate to a physical difference. The
Court has done so before. In United States v. Virginia, the Court
first recognized that the Constitution proscribes reliance on sex
even when the state is regulating in the context of physical sex
differences—in this case, for the purpose of admittance to the allmale Virginia Military Institute (VMI).397 Before Virginia, basing a law in a physical sex difference was the end of the equal
protection inquiry. If the law regulated in the context of a physical difference, this would justify reliance on sex; there was no
need to turn to a stereotyping analysis.398 In Virginia, however,
even though physical differences between the sexes were relevant to VMI’s physical training program, this did not end the
inquiry. Rather, the Court evaluated whether the law’s reliance
on sex was based in an “overbroad generalization[].”399 Virginia
was thus a turning point in sex equality law: whereas “‘real’ differences [once] served as a check on the reach of anti-stereotyping doctrine,” after the decision, “anti-stereotyping doctrine
serves as a check on the state’s regulation of ‘real’ differences.”400
Hibbs brought this doctrinal revolution to the context of parenting, and, in so doing, shows us the way to unsexing breastfeeding.401 Even though the ability to bear a child and the physical recovery period it entails differ by sex, the Hibbs Court
closely scrutinized parental leave policies following the birth of
a child to ensure that any sex classification was fully supported
by this difference and not sex stereotypes.402 The Court made
clear that the physical sex difference of recovery from childbirth

396. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003)
(distinguishing between sex classifications justified by “differential physical
needs of men and women,” and those premised in “sex-role stereotype[s]”).
397. See Franklin, supra note 15, at 145–46 (explaining that “the [Virginia]
Court’s treatment of the issue of ‘real’ differences marked a new departure for
constitutional sex discrimination doctrine”).
398. Id.
399. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
400. Franklin, supra note 15, at 145–46.
401. See id. at 149–54.
402. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003) (explaining impermissibility of “differential leave policies . . . not attributable to any
differential physical needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sexrole stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work”).
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could justify a sex-based difference in leave policies, but only for
this period of physical recovery and no longer.403
Unsexing breastfeeding would require extending this equal
protection analysis to the context of breastfeeding. Given that
both recovery from childbirth and breastfeeding relate to a physical sex difference that accompanies bearing a child, applying
Hibbs to unsex breastfeeding is no great stretch. Under this approach, even though a breastfeeding law might relate to the
physical sex difference of lactation, the law could only regulate
on the basis of sex to the extent that the difference of lactation
justified reliance on sex and no more.
B. DEPLOYING SCRUTINY
Applying heightened scrutiny to breastfeeding would allow
courts to classify breastfeeding regulations into one of three
types: (1) those regulations that do not implicate physical sex
differences; (2) those regulations that implicate physical sex differences and are justified by them; and (3) those regulations that
implicate physical sex differences but are not justified by them.
The remainder of this Section discusses these three types of
breastfeeding regulations and then highlights how this mode of
unsexing breastfeeding could enhance equality between men
and women, and for lesbian, gay, transgender, and nonbinary
parents.
Regulations of the first type—those not based in any physical differences—would not survive scrutiny. For example, laws
that mandate that insurers cover the cost of breastfeeding classes for women but not men when such classes focus on the components of feeding infants expressed breastmilk would be suspect.404 Unsexing breastfeeding requires an approach that views
with skepticism laws based in the assumption that fathers will

403. See id. at 731 n.4 (indicating that any sex-based leave beyond the “four
to eight weeks” of “medical recovery period for a normal childbirth” would be
impermissible).
404. See, e.g., Pumping and Storing Breastmilk, LACTATION LINK, https://
lactationlink.com/pumping-storing-breastmilk [https://perma.cc/C787-CY6C]
(describing class focused on “[h]ow to get your free breast pump through your
insurance,” “[p]ump parts,” “[i]ntroducing a bottle,” and “[s]afe handling, storage, and warming guidelines for breastmilk”); infra Part II.B.1 (discussing how
the law sexes access to breastfeeding education).
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not invest in breastfeeding capital and will not engage in breastfeeding labor.405
The second and third classes of cases—those based in physical differences—are harder to separate. Following Virginia and
Hibbs, a physical sex difference would not on its own determine
the constitutionality of a sex-based breastfeeding regulation.406
Instead, courts would have to evaluate whether women and men
are “similarly situated” with regard to the regulation, notwithstanding any physical sex difference.407 In so doing, courts would
need to look to the purpose of the sex classification (whether it
is sufficiently “important”) and whether the sex classification in
fact furthers that purpose (whether it is “substantially related”
to achieving the purpose).408 Laws can only rely on sex when it
is a perfect proxy for the law’s objective.409 In other words, any
reliance on sex must extend no further than necessary to accomplish the law’s goal to avoid the stricture against “overbroad generalizations” premised on sex stereotypes.410
Applying this type of heightened scrutiny to breastfeeding
might leave some sex-based breastfeeding regulations in place.
There are some benefits that could be provided only to breastfeeding persons without raising constitutional concerns. A nursing bra is one example,411 as the benefits come solely from the
physical difference of lactation. Even in these instances, the law
should classify on the basis of lactation rather than on the basis
of sex, to account for lactating transgender men and nonbinary
405. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (“Stereotypes about women’s domestic
roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men.”); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1975) (“It is
no less important for a child to be cared for by its . . . parent when that parent
is male rather than female.”).
406. See supra notes 397–403 and accompanying text.
407. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)) (explaining that the Equal
Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973)
(quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that heightened scrutiny of sex classifications is meant to ensure that “similarly situated” men and women are treated the same).
408. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (stating that the sex “classification [must] serve[ ] important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed [must be]
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives”).
409. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
410. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34.
411. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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persons.412 So a regulation granting support that would benefit
only those who are lactating should confer such support in a sexneutral way, to the “lactating person,” not to “women” or “mothers,” as current law does.413
Even when breastfeeding laws regulate on the basis of sex
in the context of physical differences, these physical differences
may not be sufficiently related to the purpose of the law to legitimate a sex-based regulation. Consider a law that seeks to promote breastfeeding by mandating insurance coverage for breastfeeding classes that cover topics related to the physical
difference of lactation, like proper latches and breastfeeding positions—but only for women.414 As an initial matter, such a law
is infirm for excluding lactating transgender men and nonbinary
persons. But this type of law also falls short by excluding nonlactating fathers. Non-lactating fathers (and mothers) can use
the knowledge imparted by such a class to provide breastfeeding
support and guidance, and are sometimes better positioned to do
so because they are not breastfeeding.415 And if the goal of these
laws is to promote breastfeeding, the exclusion of men is difficult
to justify, as research shows that providing this type of education
to fathers substantially increases breastfeeding.416
Or consider laws that grant women the right to breastfeed
wherever they are otherwise allowed to be.417 Again, these laws
are problematic for excluding lactating transgender men and
nonbinary persons. But they are also problematic for excluding

412. See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
413. See supra Part II.B. Language matters. The term “breastfeeding” refers
to a traditionally female activity, but replacing it with “chestfeeding” may be
provocative. See Brighton NHS Trust Introduces New Trans-Friendly Terms,
BBC (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-sussex-56007728
[https://perma.cc/ML8B-4K5N] (reporting on such a change in British health
service and objection that this “entirely replac[es] any language related to womanhood”); cf. Chase Strangio, Can Reproductive Trans Bodies Exist?, 19 CUNY
L. REV. 223, 229–30 (2016) (discussing objection to transgender inclusion in reproductive rights for severing its connection to womanhood). Policymakers
might refer to “lactation” where possible, and to add the term “chestfeeding” to
“breastfeeding” rather than replace it. See Bartick et al., supra note 27, at 587
(adopting “desexed or gender-inclusive language (e.g., using ‘lactating person’
instead of ‘mother’)” in order “[t]o be inclusive of all people in our written materials”).
414. See supra Part II.B.1; App. B.
415. See supra notes 146–55, 172–74 and accompanying text.
416. See sources cited supra note 137.
417. See supra Part II.B.3; App. E.
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non-lactating fathers and mothers. While of course only the lactating parent is required to breastfeed the child, the non-lactating parent’s presence can be quite valuable, particularly in promoting breastfeeding—the goal of many of these laws.418 For
those who are not comfortable breastfeeding in public without
partner support, the partner’s presence is a practical necessity.419 And the partner’s presence is also critical for performing
forms of infant care, like changing a diaper, that arise during the
process of breastfeeding. Given the key role that partners play
in supporting breastfeeding and providing infant care, the limitation of legal protection to the breastfeeding woman should be
viewed skeptically.
Finally, consider a law that provides breastfeeding women
an accommodation in the form of break time from work with the
dual goals of promoting breastfeeding and women’s labor market
outcomes.420 Such a law would be infirm to the extent it excludes
lactating transgender men and nonbinary persons.421 Still further, the law should be suspect for excluding non-lactating fathers and mothers. Only the lactating parent will require break
time from work to express milk. But non-lactating parents can
engage in care work that is necessary for successful breastfeeding and that can only be done with break time from work. When
a mother forgets a breastpump accessory or a breastpump
breaks, a father can bring these items to her. By reducing
(slightly) the work-related costs of lactation for women and increasing (slightly) the work-related costs of lactation for men,
extending workplace breastfeeding accommodations in this way
helps to advance women’s role at work and men’s role at home.422
Notwithstanding the relevance of the physical difference of lactation, a sex-based law would be questionable, because the sex
classification undermines the objectives of the law.
To be sure, the fact that laws in this third category could
better achieve their aims by including men is not by itself fatal.
“[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State
must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not
attacking the problem at all.”423 In such cases, legislative intent
418. See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
420. See supra Part II.B.2; App. C.
421. See supra notes 290–95 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 125–26, 332 and accompanying text (discussing this
rationale in the context of the FMLA).
423. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970).
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matters. For these laws to survive, the lesser role of paternal
support in promoting breastfeeding—and not stereotypical
views of the relative importance of mothers and fathers to caregiving—must have been the actual reason for the law’s reliance
on sex.424 This might save laws whose goal is to promote breastfeeding, but will do less to save breastfeeding-related provisions
in laws like the FMLA, which are aimed at achieving sex equality.425
If sex classifications in breastfeeding regulations are
deemed unconstitutional, courts must determine the appropriate remedy. When a statute that “benefits one class . . . and excludes another from the benefit” violates equal protection, “[a]
court may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its
benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to
benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include
those who are aggrieved by exclusion.”426 The first approach is
known as “leveling down,” and the second approach “leveling
up.”427 Typically, “extension, rather than nullification, is the
proper course” both generally428 and specifically in the context of
sex discrimination.429
Legislative intent guides the choice between leveling up and
leveling down.430 In deciding which approach best comports with
legislative intent, “a court should measure the intensity of commitment to the residual policy—the main rule, not the exception—and consider the degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to
424. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (instructing that
“[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in
response to litigation[,] [a]nd it must not rely on overbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females”).
425. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5) (including among its purposes “that fathers and mothers be able to participate in early childrearing” and
“to promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women and men”).
426. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698 (2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979)).
427. Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 (2004).
428. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1699 (internal quotation marks omitted).
429. See id. at 1699–1700 (recognizing this principle and citing many examples, but explaining that “[a]lthough extension of benefits is customary in federal benefit cases . . . all indicators in this case point in the opposite direction”).
430. See id. at 1699 (“The choice between these outcomes is governed by the
legislature’s intent, as revealed by the statute at hand.”).
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abrogation.”431 To the extent that the legislative purpose of sexed
breastfeeding laws is to support and promote breastfeeding, leveling up to include men is most consistent with this intent.432
Note also that most sexed breastfeeding laws do not simply give
greater benefits or protections to women than men; they provide
men with nothing at all.433 Leveling down to remove all breastfeeding support “is scarcely a purpose one can sensibly attribute
to [these legislatures].”434
Despite sometimes435 imposing additional costs, leveling up
is critical to moving toward a more equal distribution of care
work across the sexes. This is because, as the Supreme Court has
explained, a simple rule of equality is not enough to unsex parenting in light of the gendered distribution of care work that already exists.436 A rule that grants no breastfeeding benefits at
all might satisfy the dictates of formal equality,437 but would
have a serious disparate impact in a world where women already
do far more care work related to breastfeeding. In light of this, a
431. Id. at 1700 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 (1984)).
432. See sources cited supra note 137 (discussing how father involvement in
breastfeeding both supports and promotes breastfeeding).
433. This fact distinguishes this case from Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at
1701, a recent sex discrimination decision—“hardly the typical case”—where
the Court cured the equal protection violation by leveling down.
434. Id. at 1700.
435. I say “sometimes” because leveling up some of the breastfeeding regulations under study here, such as extending public accommodation rights to
partners, would not impose any financial cost.
436. See Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003).
437. I say “might” because eliminating certain breastfeeding protections for
women might be sex discriminatory, on the ground that they affect women
alone. See supra notes 198, 243–45 and accompanying text (discussing case law
holding that breastfeeding discrimination is sex discrimination for this reason);
cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 323 n.20, 327 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As the capacity to become pregnant is a characteristic
necessarily associated with one sex, a classification based on the capacity to
become pregnant is a classification based on sex.”). Unsexing breastfeeding
need not put an end to such protections. Acknowledging that biological features
once thought to be exclusive to women can also affect men (either transgender
or cisgender) does not mean that discrimination on the basis of these features
is not discrimination on the basis of sex, but to recognize it as such might require turning to a theory of sex stereotyping or disparate impact. See Clarke,
supra note 42, at 956 (explaining “that in practice, discrimination based on pregnancy drives women’s inequality, that it is based on the assumption that all
workers meet a traditionally male norm, or that it is a thinly veiled attempt to
exclude women from the workplace”).
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formally equal rule that affords no caregiving benefits to anyone
“would exclude far more women than men from the workplace”
and would “continue to reinforce the stereotype of women as
caregivers.”438
By encouraging men to do more caregiving, affirmative caregiving benefits afforded to men and women equally have the potential to disrupt both the reality of the gendered distribution of
care work, and the “stereotype that only women are responsible
for family caregiving.”439 In turn, such benefits can ensure that
caregiving accommodations “w[ill] no longer be stigmatized as
an inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female employees,” and that “employers c[an]not evade [such] obligations
simply by hiring men.”440
Critics might favor leveling down on the ground of sex equality. Some feminist thinkers argue that to the extent the law
seeks to promote breastfeeding, it inevitably sexes parenting.441
But such an argument ignores the role that men can play in
breastfeeding. This Article has shown how unsexing breastfeeding can help to relieve the tension between the state’s twin goals
of promoting breastfeeding and unsexing parenting. Because
some aspects of breastfeeding can be performed by any parent,
regardless of sex, the state can simultaneously promote breastfeeding and unsex parenting.442
While leveling up is the preferred remedy for breastfeeding
laws that impermissibly rely on sex, this does not mean that the
exact benefits currently granted to women must be extended to
438. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738.
439. Id. at 737; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (explaining that an affirmative caregiving benefit as provided by the FMLA “minimizes the potential for
employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave
is available for eligible medical reasons (including maternity-related disability)
and for compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis”).
440. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737.
441. See Cohen, supra note 181, at 159 (indicating that from one “feminist
perspective . . . [i]n as much as breastfeeding is seen as an aspect of maternal
experience that is not shareable with men, it is repudiated as an ideological
practice that maintains women’s subordination”).
442. These same feminist critics might respond that, notwithstanding the
ability to unsex some aspects of breastfeeding, lactation—the most time-consuming aspect of breastfeeding—cannot be unsexed, and thus promoting breastfeeding continues to sex parenting. The Article targets the constitutionally problematic dimensions of the sexed law of breastfeeding. It takes as given the policy
choice of promoting breastfeeding and does not address whether the state would
better promote sex equality by adopting a different stance towards breastfeeding.
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cisgender men. The physical difference of lactation may still be
relevant. For example, when it comes to laws that provide workplace accommodations for women to express breastmilk during
the workday,443 cisgender men obviously do not need regular
break time to express breastmilk. Rather, they can be made
equal with break time for breastfeeding care work that might be
necessary for expressing milk during the workday, such as bringing a forgotten breastpump to the mother’s workplace.444
Just because leveling up to spur father involvement in caregiving is the remedy most consistent with sex equality law does
not mean that father involvement in breastfeeding will always
be easy for women. At the individual level, it may be difficult for
women to create space for men in a domain that has typically
been for mothers only, especially because breastfeeding has so
often been viewed as a source of maternal-child bonding.445 At
the group level, it may be difficult for women to create space for
men in places like breastfeeding rooms and support groups,
which may require overcoming discomfort with men in these intimate spaces.446 Looking abroad to programs aimed at encouraging father involvement in breastfeeding in a number of countries shows that these challenges are manageable.447
CONCLUSION
This Article has made visible the sexed law of breastfeeding,
surfaced its tension with pervasive efforts to unsex parenting in
the rest of sex equality law, and begun the project of resolving
this tension. With many sexed breastfeeding laws already on the

443. See supra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.
444. One approach would extend breastfeeding accommodations to caregiving responsibilities generally, whether related to breastfeeding or not.
445. See Cahn, supra note 331, at 209–10 (discussing how gendered norms
may lead mothers to engage in “gatekeeping” vis-à-vis fathers to retain the primary maternal role).
446. See supra Part III.B.2.
447. See, e.g., PARENT INFANT FEEDING INITIATIVE, CURTIN U., http://
pifistudy.net.au [https://perma.cc/B37J-LFRG] (discussing breastfeeding initiative in Australia with interventions channeled through the father); Dads and
Breastfeeding, OXFORD HEALTH NHS FOUND. TRUST, https://www.oxfordhealth
.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CY-173.16-Dads-and-breastfeeding.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E7J6-E22Z] (subdivision of British National Health Service
providing comprehensive advice to fathers in the U.K. on how to support breastfeeding).
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books, and new sexed breastfeeding laws on the horizon,448 the
time to take up this project is now. Mounting evidence449 that
motherhood, rather than sex per se, is the most significant contributor to gender inequality in the workplace makes the stakes
clear: sex equality in private and public life. We will never unsex
parenting as much as we want until we unsex breastfeeding as
much as we should.

448. See, e.g., PUMP for Nursing Mothers Act, S. 1658, 117th Cong. (2021),
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/117/s1658/text [https://perma.cc/CZ9N
-2SG2] (proposing to extend the FLSA provision on “reasonable break time for
nursing mothers” to other classes of employees).
449. See, e.g., Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais & Jakob Egholt Sogaard,
Children and Gender Inequality: Evidence from Denmark, 11 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 181, 182 (2019) (attributing eighty percent of the gender wage gap
to motherhood); Claire Cain Miller, The Gender Pay Gap Is Largely Because of
Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (May 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/05/13/upshot/the-gender-pay-gap-is-largely-because-of-motherhood
.html [https://perma.cc/Q5YR-L4ZJ] (collecting studies).
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APPENDIX A: FEDERAL BREASTFEEDING LAWS450
“Breastfeeding promotion program”: 42 U.S.C. § 1790: “The
Secretary . . . shall establish a breastfeeding promotion program
to promote breastfeeding as the best method of infant nutrition,
foster wider public acceptance of breastfeeding in the United
States, and assist in the distribution of breastfeeding equipment
to breastfeeding women.”
• “Nutrition education”: 7 C.F.R. § 246.11(c)(7) (2021):
“Establish standards for breastfeeding promotion and
support which include, at a minimum, the following . . .
(iv) A plan to ensure that women have access to breastfeeding promotion and support activities during the prenatal and postpartum periods.”
“Child nutrition”: 45 C.F.R. § 1302.44(a)(2)(viii) (2021): “Promote breastfeeding, including providing facilities to properly
store and handle breast milk and make accommodations, as necessary, for mothers who wish to breastfeed during [Headstart]
program hours, and if necessary, provide referrals to lactation
consultants or counselors[.]”
“Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004”: Pub. L. No. 108199, 118 Stat. 357 § 629: “Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, a woman may breastfeed her child at any location in a
Federal building or on Federal property, if the woman and her
child are otherwise authorized to be present at the location.”
“Coverage of preventive health services”: 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-13(a)(4): “A group health plan and a health insurance
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage
shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose
any cost sharing requirements for . . . with respect to women,
such additional preventive care and screenings not described in
paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration for
purposes of this paragraph.”

450. This appendix lists only those federal laws that expressly reference
“breastfeeding,” “nursing,” or “lactation.” Other federal laws that sex breastfeeding without referencing these terms, such as the Family and Medical Leave
Act and Pregnancy Discrimination Act, are discussed in Part II.B, supra.
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• “Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines”: HRSA
Health Resources & Service Administration: “Breastfeeding Services and Supplies—The Women’s Preventive Services Initiative recommends comprehensive lactation support services (including counseling, education, and
breastfeeding equipment and supplies) during the antenatal, perinatal, and the postpartum period to ensure the
successful initiation and maintenance of breastfeeding.”
“Establishment of Breastfeeding Policy for the Department of the Army”: 10 U.S.C. § 733: “The Secretary of the
Army shall develop a comprehensive policy regarding breastfeeding by female members of the Army who are breastfeeding.”
• “Procedures”: 32 C.F.R. § 79.6 Table 1(B) (2021): “The
facility [a military-operated child daycare center] has a
designated place set aside for breastfeeding mothers who
want to come during work to breastfeed, as well as a private area with an outlet (not a bathroom) for mothers to
pump their breast milk.”
“Exemptions from classification as a banned toy or other
banned article for use by children”: 16 C.F.R. §1500.86(a)(9)
(2021): “Boston Billow Nursing Pillow and substantially similar
nursing pillows that are designed to be used only as a nursing
aide for breastfeeding mothers. For example, are tubular in
form, C- or crescent-shaped to fit around a nursing mother’s
waist, round in circumference and filled with granular material.”
“Lactation room in public buildings”: 40 U.S.C. § 3318: “Except as provided in subsection (c), the appropriate authority of a
covered public building shall ensure that the building contains a
lactation room that is made available for use by members of the
public to express breast milk.”
“McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and
Child Nutrition Program”: 7 U.S.C. § 1736o-01(b): “[T]he Secretary may establish a program, to be known as ‘McGovern-Dole
International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program’,
requiring the procurement of agricultural commodities and the
provision of financial and technical assistance to carry out . . .
(2) maternal, infant, and child nutrition programs for pregnant
women, nursing mothers, infants, and children who are 5 years
of age or younger.”
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“Mothers’ Rooms”: 49 U.S.C. § 47107(w)(3)(A)(i): “The Secretary of Transportation may approve an application under this
subchapter for an airport development project grant only if the
Secretary receives written assurances that the airport owner or
operator will maintain (A) a lactation area in the sterile area of
each passenger terminal building of the airport . . . . (A) ‘lactation area’ means a room or similar accommodation that . . .
(i) provides a location for members of the public to express breast
milk that is shielded from view and free from intrusion from the
public.”
“Nursing mothers”: 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(f)(8)(i)–(ii) (2021): “If a
drug is absorbed systemically, this subsection of the labeling
shall contain, if known, information about excretion of the drug
in human milk and effects on the nursing infant . . . Caution
should be exercised when (name of drug) is administered to a
nursing woman.”
“Reasonable break time for nursing mothers”: 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(r): “An employer shall provide—(A) a reasonable break
time for an employee to express breast milk for her nursing child
for 1 year after the child’s birth each time such employee has
need to express the milk; and (B) a place, other than a bathroom,
that is shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the public, which may be used by an employee to express
breast milk.”
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APPENDIX B: STATE HEALTHCARE BREASTFEEDING
LAWS
Alaska: H. Con. Res. 18, 28th Leg. (Alaska 2014): “WHEREAS
the immediate skin-to-skin contact in breastfeeding enhances
the emotional connection between the mother and infant . . . be
it FURTHER RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature
strongly encourages hospitals and birthing facilities in the state
to receive the baby-friendly designation by implementing the
Ten Steps to Successful Breastfeeding program.”
California: Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123360(a) (West 2022):
“The State Department of Public Health shall include in its public service campaign the promotion of mothers breast-feeding
their infants.”
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-503f(a)(1) (2022): “[E]ach
[covered] individual health insurance policy . . . shall provide
coverage for the following benefits and services: . . . (R) Breastfeeding support and counseling for any pregnant or breastfeeding woman; (S) Breastfeeding supplies, including, but not limited to, a breast pump for any breastfeeding woman.”
Hawaii: H. Con. Res. 158, 25th Leg. (Haw. 2010): “BE IT RESOLVED by the House of Representatives of the Twenty-fifth
Legislature of the State of Hawaii, Regular Session of 2010, the
Senate concurring, that the Department of Human Services, in
consultation with the Department of Health, is urged to develop
a program to encourage breastfeeding among mothers who receive medical assistance from Medicaid[.]”
Illinois:
• 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3.4(a) (2022): “In addition to any
other right provided under this Act, every woman has the
following rights with regard to pregnancy and childbirth:
. . . (16) The right to receive information about breastfeeding.”
• 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 81/10 (2022): “Every hospital that
provides birthing services must adopt an infant feeding
policy that promotes breastfeeding An infant feeding policy adopted under this Section shall include guidance on
the use of formula (i) for medically necessary supplemen-
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tation, (ii) if preferred by the mother, or (iii) when exclusively breastfeeding is contraindicated for the mother or
for the infant.”
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 145.894 (2022): “The commissioner of
health shall: (1) develop a comprehensive state plan for the delivery of nutritional supplements to pregnant and lactating
women, infants, and children[.]”
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-135-5(1) (2022): “Hospitals
that provide birth services may adopt an infant feeding policy
that promotes and supports breast-feeding. Any infant feeding
policies adopted under this section shall include guidance on the
use of formula (a) for medically necessary supplementation; (b) if
preferred by the mother; or (c) when exclusive breast-feeding is
not advised for the mother and/or infant.”
Missouri: MO. REV. STAT. § 191.915 (2022): “Every hospital, as
defined in section 197.020, and ambulatory surgical center, as
defined in section 197.200, that provides obstetrical care shall:
(1) Provide new mothers, where appropriate as determined by
the attending physician, with information on breast-feeding and
the benefits to the child; and (2) Provide new mothers, where appropriate as determined by the attending physician, with information on local breast-feeding support groups; or (3) Offer
breast-feeding consultations to new mothers, where appropriate
as determined by the attending physician.”
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 74.09.475(1) (2022): “[T]he authority shall require that all health care facilities that provide
newborn delivery services to medical assistance clients establish
policies and procedures to provide: (a) Skin-to-skin placement of
the newborn on the mother’s chest immediately following birth
to promote the initiation of breastfeeding, except as otherwise
indicated by authority guidelines; and (b) Room-in practices in
which a newborn and a mother share the same room for the duration of their postdelivery stay at the facility, except as otherwise indicated by authority guidelines.”
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APPENDIX C: STATE WORKPLACE BREASTFEEDING
LAWS
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-116 (2022): “Break time for
expressing breast milk”: “(a) (1) An employer shall provide reasonable unpaid break time each day to an employee who needs
to express breast milk for her child in order to maintain milk
supply and comfort.”
California: Cal. Lab. Code § 1030–1034 et seq. (West 2022):
“Lactation Accommodation”: “Every employer, including the
state and any political subdivision, shall provide a reasonable
amount of break time to accommodate an employee desiring to
express breast milk for the employee’s infant child each time the
employee has need to express milk.”
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.5-104(1) (2022): “Right of
nursing mothers to express breast milk in workplace - private
location - discrimination prohibited”: “An employer shall provide
reasonable unpaid break time or permit an employee to use paid
break time, meal time, or both, each day to allow the employee
to express breast milk for her nursing child for up to two years
after the child’s birth.”
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40w (2022): “Breastfeeding in the workplace”: “(a) Any employee may, at her discretion,
express breast milk or breastfeed on site at her workplace during
her meal or break period . . . (c) An employer shall not discriminate against, discipline or take any adverse employment action
against any employee because such employee has elected to exercise her rights under subsection (a) of this section.”
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-6 (2022): “Employer obligation
to provide time for women to express breast milk for infant
child”: “[a]n employer may provide reasonable unpaid break time
each day to an employee who needs to express breast milk for
her infant child.”
Hawaii:
• HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (2022): “Discriminatory practices
made unlawful; offenses defined”: “(a) It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: . . . (7) For any employer
or labor organization to refuse to hire or employ, bar or
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discharge from employment, withhold pay from, demote,
or penalize a lactating employee because the employee
breastfeeds or expresses milk at the workplace. For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘breastfeeds’ means the
feeding of a child directly from the breast.”
• Act of July 1, 2013, No. 249, 2013 Haw. Sess. Laws 751:
“Relating to Breastfeeding in the Workplace”: “An employer shall provide: (1) Reasonable break time for an employee to express milk for an employee’s nursing child for
one year after the child’s birth each time the employee has
a need to express breast milk.”
Illinois: 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 260/10 (2022): “Break time for
nursing mothers”: “An employer shall provide reasonable break
time to an employee who needs to express breast milk for her
nursing infant child each time the employee has the need to express milk for one year after the child’s birth . . . An employer
may not reduce an employee’s compensation for time used for the
purpose of expressing milk or nursing a baby.”
Indiana: IND. CODE § 5-10-6-2 (2022): “Paid breaks for expressing breast milk”: “(a) The state and political subdivisions of the
state shall provide reasonable paid break time each day to an
employee who needs to express breast milk for the employee’s
infant child.”
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (2022): “Unlawful discrimination by employers”: “It is an unlawful practice for an employer: . . . (c) To fail to make reasonable accommodations for
any employee with limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth,
or a related medical condition who requests an accommodation,
including but not limited to the need to express breast milk, unless the employer can demonstrate the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the employer’s program, enterprise, or business.”
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 604 (West 2022) “Nursing
mothers in the workplace”: “An employer . . . shall provide adequate unpaid break time or permit an employee to use paid
break time or meal time each day to express breast milk for her
nursing child for up to 3 years following childbirth. An employer
may not discriminate in any way against an employee who
chooses to express breast milk in the workplace.”
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Maryland: MD. CODE ANN. STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-310 (West
2022): “Break time to express breast milk; facility requirements”: “(a) The State, through its appropriate officers and employees, shall provide: (1) a reasonable break time for an employee to express breast milk for her nursing child after the
child’s birth each time the employee needs to express the milk
. . . .”
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 181.939 (2022) “Nursing Mothers”:
“(a) An employer must provide reasonable break times each day
to an employee who needs to express breast milk for her infant
child during the twelve months following the birth of the child.”
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-1-55 (2022): “Discrimination
against breast-feeding mother who uses lawful break time to express milk prohibited”: “No employer shall prohibit an employee
from expressing breast milk during any meal period or other
break period provided by the employer.”
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-215 (2021): “Public employer policy on support of women and breastfeeding—unlawful
discrimination . . . public employer policy on support of women
and breastfeeding—unlawful discrimination. (1) All state and
county governments, municipalities, and school districts and the
university system must have a written policy supporting women
who want to continue breastfeeding after returning from maternity leave.”
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-20-2 (2022): “Use of a breast
pump in the workplace”: “A. In order to foster the ability of a
nursing mother who is an employee to use a breast pump in
the workplace, an employer, including the state and its political
subdivisions, shall provide: . . . (2) . . . flexible break times.”
New York: N.Y. LAB. LAW § 206-c (McKinney 2022): “Right of
nursing mothers to express breast milk”: ”An employer shall provide reasonable unpaid break time or permit an employee to use
paid break time or meal time each day to allow an employee to
express breast milk for her nursing child for up to three years
following child birth. . . . No employer shall discriminate in any
way against an employee who chooses to express breast milk in
the work place.”
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North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-17 (2022): “Workplace
breastfeeding policies-Infant friendly designation”: “1. An employer may use the designation ‘infant friendly’ on its promotional materials if the employer adopts a workplace breastfeeding policy that includes the following: a. Flexible work
scheduling, including scheduling breaks and permitting work
patterns that provide time for expression of breast milk.”
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 435 (2022): “Break time and
accommodations for expressing milk or breast-feeding”: “A. 1. An
employer other than a state agency may provide reasonable unpaid break time each day to an employee who needs to breastfeed or express breast milk for her child to maintain milk supply
and comfort . . . C. The Department of Health shall issue periodic
reports on breast-feeding rates, complaints received, and benefits reported by both working breast-feeding mothers and employers.”
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 653.077 (2022): “Expressing milk in
workplace; rules”: “(2)(a) An employer shall provide reasonable
unpaid rest periods to accommodate an employee who needs to
express milk for the employee’s child . . . . (6) An employer may
allow an employee to temporarily change job duties if the employee’s regular job duties do not allow the employee to express
milk.”
Rhode Island: 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-13.2-1 (2022):
“Workplace policies protecting a woman’s choice to breastfeed”:
“An employer may provide reasonable unpaid break time each
day to an employee who needs to breastfeed or express breast
milk for her infant child to maintain milk supply and comfort . . .
(c) The department of health shall issue periodic reports on
breastfeeding rates, complaints received and benefits reported
by both working breastfeeding mothers and employers.”
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-130 (2022): “Break time
or meal time for employees to express breast milk; definitions;
remedies”: “An employer shall provide an employee with reasonable unpaid break time or shall permit an employee to use paid
break time or meal time each day to express breast milk . . . . An
employer may not discriminate against an employee for choosing
to express breast milk in the workplace in compliance with the
provisions of this section.”
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Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-305 (2022): “Breast milk
expressing by employees—Break time and place”: “(b) An employer shall provide reasonable unpaid break time each day to
an employee who needs to express breast milk for that employee’s infant child.”
Texas:
• TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.003 (2021):
“Business Designation As ‘Mother-Friendly’”: “(a) A business may use the designation ‘mother-friendly’ in its promotional materials if the business develops a policy supporting the practice of worksite breast-feeding that
addresses the following: (1) work schedule flexibility, including scheduling breaks and work patterns to provide
time for expression of milk . . . (4) access to hygienic storage alternatives in the workplace for the mother’s breast
milk.”
• TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.032 (2021):
“Demonstration Project”: “(a) The department shall establish a demonstration project in Travis County to provide
access to worksite breast-feeding for department employees who are mothers with infants.”
Utah:
• UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-49-202 (2022): “Nursing Mothers in
the Workplace”: “(1)(a) A public employer shall: (i) provide
for at least one year after the birth of a public employee’s
child reasonable breaks for each time the public employee
needs to breast feed or express milk . . . .”
• UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-49-204 (2022): “Nursing Mothers in
the Workplace”: “A public employer may not refuse to hire,
promote, discharge, demote, or terminate a person, or may
not retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters
of compensation or in terms, privileges, and conditions of
employment against a person otherwise qualified because
the person breastfeeds or expresses milk in the workplace.”
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 305 (2022): “Nursing mothers
in the workplace”: “(a) For an employee who is a nursing mother,
the employer shall for three years after the birth of a child:
(1) Provide reasonable time, either compensated or uncompensated, throughout the day to express breast milk for her nursing
child.”
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Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-1201 (2022): “Duties of Department; Director”: “14b. Develop state personnel policies that provide break time for nursing mothers to express breast milk. Such
policies shall require an agency to provide (i) a reasonable break
time for an employee to express breast milk for her nursing child
after the child’s birth each time such employee has need to express the breast milk.”
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 43.10.005 (2022): “Workplace
pregnancy accommodations—Unfair practices—Definitions”:
“(b) ‘Pregnancy’ includes the employee’s pregnancy and pregnancy-related health conditions, including the need to express
breast milk. (c) ‘Reasonable accommodation’ means: . . . (viii)
Providing reasonable break time for an employee to express
breast milk for two years after the child’s birth each time the
employee has need to express the milk.”
Wyoming: H.R.J. Res. 5, § 2, 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 571–72:
“Now, Therefore, Be It Resolved By The Members of the Legislature of the State of Wyoming . . . . That the Legislature encourages breastfeeding and commends employers, both in the public
and the private sector, who make accommodations for breastfeeding mothers whenever feasible.”
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APPENDIX D: STATE PUBLIC INDECENCY
BREASTFEEDING LAWS
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.060(b) (2022): “In the laws of the
state, ‘lewd conduct,’ ‘lewd touching,’ ‘immoral conduct,’ ‘indecent conduct,’ and similar terms do not include the act of a
woman breast-feeding a child in a public or private location
where the woman and child are otherwise authorized to be.”
Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1402(B) (2022): “Indecent
exposure does not include an act of breast-feeding by a mother.”
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-112(c) (2022): “A woman is
not in violation of this section [criminalizing indecent exposure]
for breastfeeding a child in a public place or any place where
other individuals are present.”
District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.82(c)(2) (2022):
“Notwithstanding any other provision of District of Columbia
law governing indecent exposure or the definition of the private
or intimate parts of a female person, including that portion of
the breast that is below the top of the areola, a woman shall have
the right to breastfeed in accordance with this section.”
Florida: FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (2022): “A person who commits any
unnatural and lascivious act with another person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in
[§] 775.082 or [§] 775.083. A mother’s breastfeeding of her baby
does not under any circumstance violate this section.”
Louisiana: LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:2247.1 (2022): “E. Breastfeeding
not a violation of law. A mother breastfeeding her baby in any
location, public or private, where the mother is otherwise authorized to be, shall not be deemed to be in violation of R.S. 14:106
[obscenity] or of any other provision of law.”
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 221 (2022): “Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, the act
of a mother breastfeeding her child, and any exposure of a breast
incidental thereto that is solely for the purpose of nursing such
child, shall not be considered lewd, indecent, immoral, or unlawful conduct.”
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Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 41.181(4) (2022): “Public nudity
does not include any of the following: (a) A woman’s breastfeeding of a baby whether or not the nipple or areola is exposed during or incidental to the feeding.”
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 617.23 (2022): “Indecent Exposure;
Penalties . . . . It is not a violation of this section for a woman to
breastfeed.”
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-31 (2022): “A person who
willfully and lewdly exposes his person, or private parts thereof,
in any public place, or in any place where others are present, or
procures another to so expose himself, is guilty of a misdemeanor
. . . . It is not a violation of this statute for a woman to breastfeed.”
Missouri: MO. REV. STAT. § 191.918 (2022): “The act of a mother
breast-feeding a child or expressing breast milk in a public or
private location where the mother and child are otherwise authorized to be shall not: (2) Be considered an act of public indecency, indecent exposure, sexual conduct, lewd touching, or obscenity or any other similar term for purposes of state or
municipal law.”
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.210(2) (2021): “For the purposes
of this section, the breast feeding of a child by the mother of the
child does not constitute an act of open or gross lewdness.”
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:10-d (2022):
“Breast-feeding a child does not constitute an act of indecent exposure and to restrict or limit the right of a mother to breastfeed her child is discriminatory.”
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.9(b) (2022): “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a woman may breast
feed in any public or private location where she is otherwise authorized to be, irrespective of whether the nipple of the mother’s
breast is uncovered during or incidental to the breast feeding.”
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-40(B) (2022): “Breastfeeding a child in a location where the mother is authorized to
be is not considered indecent exposure.”
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South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24A-2(10) (2022):
“This term [obscene] does not include a mother’s breast-feeding
of her baby;”
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-511(d) (2022): “Indecent
exposure . . . . This section does not apply to a mother who is
breastfeeding her child in any location, public or private.”
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-702(3) (2022): “A woman’s breast
feeding, including breast feeding in any location where the
woman otherwise may rightfully be, does not under any circumstance constitute a lewd act, irrespective of whether or not the
breast is covered during or incidental to feeding.”
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 61-8-9(a) (2022): “Provided, That
it is not considered indecent exposure for a mother to breast feed
a child in any location, public or private.”
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 944.20 (2021): “(1) Whoever does any of
the following is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor: (a) Commits an
indecent act of sexual gratification with another with knowledge
that they are in the presence of others; or (b) Publicly and indecently exposes genitals or pubic area. (2) Subsection (1) does not
apply to a mother’s breast-feeding of her child.”
Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-201(b) (2022): “The act of
breastfeeding an infant child, including breastfeeding in any
place where the woman may legally be, does not constitute public
indecency.”
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APPENDIX E: STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
BREASTFEEDING LAWS
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 22-1-13 (2022): “A mother may breastfeed her child in any location, public or private, where the
mother is otherwise authorized to be present.”
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 29.25.080 (2022): “A municipality may
not enact an ordinance that prohibits or restricts a woman
breast-feeding a child in a public or private location where the
woman and child are otherwise authorized to be.”
Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1443 (2022): “A mother is entitled to breast-feed in any area of a public place or a place of public accommodation where the mother is otherwise lawfully present.”
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-27-2001 (2022): “A woman may
breastfeed a child in a public place or any place where other individuals are present.”
California: CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.3 (2022): “Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, a mother may breastfeed her child in
any location, public or private, except the private home or residence of another, where the mother and the child are otherwise
authorized to be present.”
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-302 (2022): “A mother may
breast-feed in any place she has a right to be.”
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-34b (2022): “No person
may restrict or limit the right of a mother to breast-feed her
child.”
Delaware: DEL. CODE tit. 31, § 310 (2022): “Notwithstanding
any provisions of law to the contrary, a mother shall be entitled
to breast-feed her child in any location of a place of public accommodation wherein the mother is otherwise permitted.”
District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.82(c)(1) (2022):
“A woman shall have the right to breastfeed her child in any location, public or private, where she has the right to be with her
child, without respect to whether the mother’s breast or any part

2022]

UNSEXING BREASTFEEDING

231

of it is uncovered during or incidental to the breastfeeding of her
child.”
Florida: FLA. STAT. § 383.015 (2022): “A mother may breastfeed
her baby in any location, public or private, where the mother is
otherwise authorized to be, irrespective of whether the nipple of
the mother’s breast is uncovered during or incidental to the
breastfeeding.”
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-9 (2022): “A mother may breastfeed her baby in any location where the mother and baby are
otherwise authorized to be.”
Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-21 (2022): “It is a discriminatory
practice to deny, or attempt to deny, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of a place of public accommodations to a woman
because she is breastfeeding a child.”
Illinois:
• 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 137/10 (2022): “A mother may
breastfeed her baby in any location, public or private,
where the mother is otherwise authorized to be, irrespective of whether the nipple of the mother’s breast is uncovered during or incidental to the breastfeeding . . . .”
• 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 137/15 (2022): “A woman who has
been denied the right to breastfeed by the owner or manager of a public or private location, other than a private
residence or place of worship, may bring an action to enjoin future denials of the right to breastfeed. If the woman
prevails in her suit, she shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable expenses of litigation.”
Indiana: IND. CODE § 16-35-6-1 (2022): “Notwithstanding any
other law, a woman may breastfeed her child anywhere the
woman has a right to be.”
Iowa: IOWA CODE § 135.30A (2022): “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law to the contrary, a woman may breast-feed the
woman’s own child in any public place where the woman’s presence is otherwise authorized.”
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Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1,248(b) (2022): “A mother may
breastfeed in any place she has a right to be.”
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.755 (West 2022) “(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, a mother may
breast-feed her baby or express breast milk in any location, public or private, where the mother is otherwise authorized to be . . .
. (3) No person shall interfere with a mother breast-feeding her
child in any location, public or private, where the mother is otherwise authorized to be.”
Louisiana: LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:2247.1(B) (2022): “Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a mother
may breastfeed her baby in any place of public accommodation,
resort, or amusement.”
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4634 (West 2022): “Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a person may
breast-feed that person’s baby in any location, public or private,
where the person is otherwise authorized to be.”
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH—GEN. § 20-801 (West
2022): “(a) A mother may breast-feed her child in any public or
private location in which the mother and child are authorized to
be. (b) A person may not restrict or limit the right of a mother to
breast-feed her child.”
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111 § 221 (2022): “(a) A
mother may breastfeed her child in any public place or establishment or place which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public and where the mother and her child
may otherwise lawfully be present . . . (c) No person or entity,
including a governmental entity, shall, with the intent to violate
a mother’s right under subsection (a), restrict, harass or penalize
a mother who is breastfeeding her child.”
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.232 (2022): “Except where
expressly permitted by state or federal statute or a regulation
promulgated thereunder, a person with control over a public accommodation or public service shall not do any of the following:
(a) Deny the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of
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public accommodation or public service to a woman because she
is breastfeeding a child.”
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 145.905 (2022): “A mother may
breastfeed in any location, public or private, where the mother
and child are otherwise authorized to be, irrespective of whether
the nipple of the mother’s breast is uncovered during or incidental to the breastfeeding.”
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-25-9 (2022): “A mother may
breast-feed her child in any location, public or private, where the
mother is otherwise authorized to be, without respect to whether
the mother’s breast or any part of it is covered during or incidental to the breast-feeding.”
Missouri: MO. REV. STAT. § 191.918 (2022): “1. Notwithstanding
any other provision of law to the contrary, a mother may, with
discretion, breast-feed her child or express breast milk in any
public or private location where the mother is otherwise authorized to be.”
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-19-501 (2021): “(1) A mother
has a right to breastfeed the mother’s child in any location, public or private, where the mother and child are otherwise authorized to be present, irrespective of whether or not the mother’s
breast is covered during or incidental to the breastfeeding.”
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-170 (2022): “Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, a mother may breast-feed her child
in any public or private location where the mother is otherwise
authorized to be . . . .”
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.232(2) (2021): “Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, a mother may breast feed her child in
any public or private location where the mother is otherwise authorized to be, irrespective of whether the nipple of the mother’s
breast is uncovered during or incidental to the breast feeding.”
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:10-d (2022):
“Breast-feeding a child does not constitute an act of indecent exposure and to restrict or limit the right of a mother to breastfeed her child is discriminatory.”
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New Jersey: N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:4B-4(2) (2022): “Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a mother shall be
entitled to breast feed her baby in any location of a place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement wherein the mother is otherwise permitted.”
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-20-1 (2022): “A mother may
breastfeed her child in any location, public or private, where the
mother is otherwise authorized to be present.”
New York: N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-e (McKinney 2022): “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a mother may breast
feed her baby in any location, public or private, where the mother
is otherwise authorized to be, irrespective of whether or not the
nipple of the mother’s breast is covered during or incidental to
the breast feeding.”
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.9(b) (2022): “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a woman may breast
feed in any public or private location where she is otherwise authorized to be, irrespective of whether the nipple of the mother’s
breast is uncovered during or incidental to the breast feeding.”
North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-16 (2021): “If the
woman acts in a discreet and modest manner, a woman may
breastfeed her child in any location, public or private, where the
woman and child are otherwise authorized to be.”
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2022): “A mother
is entitled to breast-feed her baby in any location of a place of
public accommodation wherein the mother otherwise is permitted.”
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-234.1 (West 2022): “[A]
mother may breast-feed her baby in any location where the
mother is otherwise authorized to be.”
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 109.001 (2022): “A woman may breastfeed her child in a public place.”
Pennsylvania: 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 636.3 (2022): “A mother
shall be permitted to breastfeed her child in any location, public
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or private, where the mother and child are otherwise authorized
to be present, irrespective of whether or not the mother’s breast
is covered during or incidental to the breastfeeding.”
Rhode Island: 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-13.5-1 (2022): “A woman
may feed her child by bottle or breast in any place open to the
public.”
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-40(A) (2022): “A woman
may breastfeed her child in any location where the mother and
her child are authorized to be.”
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-35 (2022): “A mother
may breastfeed her child in any location, public or private, where
the mother and child are otherwise authorized to be present as
long as the mother is in compliance with all other state and municipal laws.”
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-58-101 (2022): “A mother
has a right to breastfeed her child in any location, public or private, where the mother and child are otherwise authorized to be
present.”
Texas: TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.002 (2021): “A
mother is entitled to breast-feed her baby or express breast milk
in any location in which the mother’s presence is otherwise authorized.”
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-15-25 (2022): “The county legislative body may not prohibit a woman’s breast feeding in any location where she otherwise may rightfully be, irrespective of
whether the breast is uncovered during or incidental to the
breast feeding.”
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(j) (2022): “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a mother may breastfeed her child
in any place of public accommodation in which the mother and
child would otherwise have a legal right to be.”
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-370 (2022): “A mother may
breastfeed in any place where the mother is lawfully present
. . . .”
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Washington: WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(1) (2022): “The
right to be free from discrimination . . . shall include, but not be
limited to: (g) The right of a mother to breastfeed her child in any
place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement.”
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 16-1-19(b) (2022): “Notwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary, a mother may
breast feed a child in any location open to the public.”
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 253.165 (2021): “A mother may breastfeed her child in any public or private location where the mother
and child are otherwise authorized to be. In such a location, no
person may prohibit a mother from breast-feeding her child, direct a mother to move to a different location to breast-feed her
child, direct a mother to cover her child or breast while breastfeeding, or otherwise restrict a mother from breast-feeding her
child as provided in this section.”
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APPENDIX F: STATE LACTATION ROOM LAWS
Illinois: 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/5(a) (2022): “On or before January 1, 2017, the airport manager of an airport operated by a
city, county, city and county, or airport district that conducts
commercial operations and that has more than 1,000,000 enplanements a year shall provide a room or other location at each
airport terminal behind the airport security screening area for
members of the public to express breast milk in private . . . .”
Louisiana: LA. STAT. ANN. § 49:148.4.1(B) (2022): “The state
buildings provided for in Subsection C of this Section shall provide suitable accommodation in the form of a room, other than a
toilet stall, for the exclusive use of women to breastfeed a child
or express breast milk.”
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-20-31 (2022): “The Department of Health shall promulgate regulations to ensure that licensed child care facilities shall be required to comply with the
following: (a) Breast-feeding mothers, including employees, shall
be provided a sanitary place that is not a toilet stall to breastfeed their children or express milk.”
New York: N.Y. PUB. BLDGS. LAW § 144(2) (McKinney 2022): “A
covered public building shall contain a lactation room that is
made available for use by a member of the public to breastfeed
or express breast milk.”
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APPENDIX G: STATE JURY SERVICE BREASTFEEDING
LAWS
California: Act of Aug. 30, 2000, ch. 266, § 1, 2000 Cal. Stat.
2441, 2441: “[A] mother of a breast-fed child can postpone jury
duty for up to one year, and after that one year, jury duty may
be further postponed upon written request by the mother.”
Connecticut: Frequently Asked Questions About Jury Service,
STATE OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.jud.ct.gov/jury/faq
.htm#10 [https://perma.cc/G22G-G3RP]: “If you are breastfeeding and choose to serve you can request a private accommodation
such as a private room to express milk. The option to postpone
jury service is also provided.”
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 2-212 (2022): “A person who is not disqualified for jury service under section 2-209, Idaho Code, may have
jury service postponed by the court or the jury commissioner only
upon a showing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, or
public necessity, or upon a showing that the juror is a mother
breastfeeding her child.”
Illinois: 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/10.3 (2022): “Any mother
nursing her child shall, upon request, be excused from jury service.”
Iowa: IOWA CODE § 607A.5 (2022): “A person shall be excused
from jury service if the person submits written documentation
verifying, to the court’s satisfaction . . . that the person is the
mother of a breastfed child and is responsible for the daily care
of the child. However, if the person is regularly employed at a
location other than the person’s household, the person shall not
be excused under this section.”
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-158 (2022): “The following persons shall be excused from jury service[:] . . . (e) a mother breastfeeding her child. Jury service shall be postponed until such
mother is no longer breastfeeding the child.”
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29A.100(4) (West 2022): “The
judge shall excuse a mother who is breastfeeding a child or expressing breastmilk from jury service until such time as the child
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is old enough that the mother is no longer breastfeeding the
child.”
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1307a(3) (2022): “A nursing
mother may claim exemption from jury service for the period
during which she is nursing her child and shall be exempt upon
making the request if she provides a letter from a physician, a
lactation consultant, or a certified nurse midwife verifying that
she is a nursing mother.”
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23 (2022): “All qualified
persons shall be liable to serve as jurors, unless excused by the
court for one (1) of the following causes[:] . . . (b) When the juror’s
attendance would cause undue or extreme physical or financial
hardship to the prospective juror or a person under his or her
care or supervision; or (c) When the potential juror is a breastfeeding mother.”
Missouri: MO. REV. STAT. § 494.430 (2022): “Upon timely application to the court, the following persons shall be excused from
service as a petit or grand juror: . . . (2) Any nursing mother,
upon her request, and with a completed written statement from
her physician to the court certifying she is a nursing mother.”
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-313(1) (2021): “An excuse
may be granted if the prospective juror is a breastfeeding mother
or otherwise has a personal obligation to provide actual and necessary care to another, including a sick, aged, or special needs
dependent who requires the prospective juror’s personal care
and attention, and comparable substitute care is either unavailable or impractical without imposing an undue economic hardship on the prospective juror or dependent person.”
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1650 (2022): “A nursing mother
who requests to be excused shall be excused from jury service
until she is no longer nursing her child, but the mother shall be
required to submit a physician’s certificate in support of her request.”
New York: N.Y. JUD. LAW § 517(a)(1) (McKinney 2022): “Except
as otherwise provided in paragraph two of this subdivision, the
commissioner of jurors may, in his or her discretion, on the ap-
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plication of a prospective juror who has been summoned to attend, excuse such prospective juror from a part or the whole of
the time of jury service or may postpone the time of jury service
to a later day during the same or any subsequent term of the
court, provided that if the prospective juror is a breastfeeding
mother and submits with her application a note from a physician
indicating that the prospective juror is breastfeeding, the commissioner shall excuse the prospective juror or postpone the time
of jury service.”
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, § 28(E) (2022): “Upon his or her
request, a person shall be exempt from service as a juror if the
person is[:] . . . 2. A mother who is breast-feeding a baby.”
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 10.050(4) (2022): “A judge of the court
or clerk of court shall excuse a woman from acting as a juror
upon the request of the woman if the woman is breast-feeding a
child.”
Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4503 (2022): “No person
shall be exempt or excused from jury duty except the following
[:]. . . (8) Breastfeeding women who request to be excused.”
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-13-10.4 (2022): “The
parent of a child expected to be born during, or immediately prior
to, the scheduled jury duty or a mother breastfeeding a baby
younger than one year may submit a written request for an exemption from jury duty to the clerk of court within ten days of
receiving the summons for jury duty. A parent who gives written
notice shall be exempt from jury duty if the baby is less than six
weeks old. A mother shall be exempt from jury duty if she is
breastfeeding a baby younger than one year.”
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-109(1) (2022): “A court may excuse an individual from jury service: (a) upon a showing . . . (iii)
that the individual is a mother who is breastfeeding a child.”
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341.1 (2022): “Any of the following persons may serve on juries in civil and criminal cases but
shall be exempt from jury service upon his request [:]. . . 8. A
person who has legal custody of and is necessarily and personally
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responsible for a child or children 16 years of age or younger requiring continuous care by him during normal court hours, or
any mother who is breast-feeding a child.”
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APPENDIX H: STATE HORTATORY BREASTFEEDING
POLICIES
Alaska: H. Con. Res. 18, 28th Leg. (Alaska 2014): “BE IT RESOLVED that the Alaska State Legislature recognizes the
unique physical, mental health, economic, and societal benefits
that breastfeeding provides to babies, mothers, families, and
communities. . . .”
Colorado:
• COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-301 (2022): “(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that: . . . (i) Breast-feeding is a basic and important act of nurturing that should
be encouraged in the interests of maternal and infant
health.”
• COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.5-102 (2022): “(2) The general assembly further declares that the purpose of this article is
for the state of Colorado to become involved in the national movement to recognize the medical importance of
breastfeeding, within the scope of complete pediatric care,
and to encourage removal of boundaries placed on nursing
mothers in the workplace.”
District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.81(a) (2022):
“The Council finds that: (1) The encouragement of a public acceptance of breastfeeding is consistent with the promotion of
family values between a mother and her child and no mother
should be made to feel incriminated or socially ostracized for
breastfeeding her child. (2) Breastfeeding a baby constitutes a
basic act of nurturing to which every mother and child has a
right and which should be encouraged in the interests of maternal and child health.”
Florida: FLA. STAT. § 383.015 (1922): “The breastfeeding of a
baby is an important and basic act of nurture which must be encouraged in the interests of maternal and child health and family values . . . .”
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-9 (2022): “The breast-feeding of
a baby is an important and basic act of nurture which should be
encouraged in the interests of maternal and child health.”
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Hawaii: Act of July 1, 2013, No. 249, 2013 Haw. Sess. Laws 751:
“The legislature finds that breastfeeding provides important
health benefits to both mother and child.”
Illinois: 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 137/5 (2022): “The General Assembly finds that breast milk offers better nutrition, immunity,
and digestion, and may raise a baby’s IQ, and that breastfeeding
offers other benefits such as improved mother-baby bonding, and
its encouragement has been established as a major goal of this
decade by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund . . . .”
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1,248 (2022): “Breast milk is
widely acknowledged to be the most complete form of nutrition
for infants, with a range of benefits for infant’s health, growth,
immunity and development and has also been shown to improve
maternal health and bonding in addition to contributing to society at large through economic and environmental gains, it is
therefore the public policy of Kansas that a mother’s choice to
breastfeed should be supported and encouraged to the greatest
extent possible.”
Louisiana: LA. STAT. ANN. § 51.2247.1(3) (2021): “The legislature does hereby declare that the promotion of family values and
infant health demands that our society put an end to the vicious
cycle of embarrassment and ignorance that constricts women
and men alike on the subject of breastfeeding, and that in a genuine effort to promote family values, our society should encourage public acceptance of this most basic act of nurture between
mother and baby and should take appropriate steps to ensure
that no mother is made to feel incriminated or socially ostracized
for breastfeeding her baby.”
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-19-501 (2021): “Nursing
mother and infant protection.”: “The Montana legislature finds
that breastfeeding a baby is an important and basic act of nurturing that must be protected in the interests of maternal and
child health and family values.”
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.232(h) (2021): “Any genuine promotion of family values should encourage public acceptance of
this most basic act of nurture between a mother and her baby,
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and no mother should be made to feel incriminated or socially
ostracized for breast feeding her child.”
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-77 (2022): “The
advisory council shall: (a) Examine best practices on behalf of
pregnant women and lactating mothers in New Hampshire.”
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-234.1 (West 2022): “The Legislature hereby declares that breast-feeding a baby constitutes a
basic act of nurturing to which every baby has a right and which
should be encouraged in the interests of maternal and child
health.”
Pennsylvania: 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 636.2 (2022): “The General
Assembly finds that breastfeeding a baby is an important and
basic act of nurturing that must be protected in the interests of
maternal and child health and family values.”
Texas: TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.001 (2021):
“The legislature finds that breast-feeding a baby is an important
and basic act of nurture that must be encouraged in the interests
of maternal and child health and family values.”
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 16-1-19 (2022): “The Legislature
finds that breast feeding is an important, basic act of nurturing
that is protected in the interests of maternal and child health.”

